Bipartite and multipartite entangled states are of central interest in quantum information processing and foundational studies. Efficient verification of these states, especially in the adversarial scenario, is a key to various applications, including quantum computation, quantum simulation, and quantum networks. However, little is know about this topic in the adversarial scenario. Here we initiate a systematic study of pure-state verification in the adversarial scenario. In particular, we introduce a general method for determining the minimal number of tests required by a given strategy to achieve a given precision. In the case of homogeneous strategies, we can even derive an analytical formula. Furthermore, we propose a general recipe to verifying pure quantum states in the adversarial scenario by virtue of protocols for the nonadversarial scenario. Thanks to this recipe, the resource cost for verifying an arbitrary pure state in the adversarial scenario is comparable to the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario, and the overhead is at most three times for high-precision verification. Our recipe can readily be applied to efficiently verify bipartite pure states, stabilizer states, hypergraph states, weighted graph states, and Dicke states in the adversarial scenario. This paper is an extended version of the companion paper [1] .
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum states encode all the information about a quantum system and play a central role in quantum information processing. For example, bipartite entangled states, especially maximally entangled states, are crucial to quantum teleportation, dense coding, and quantum cryptography [2, 3] . Multipartite entangled states, such as graph states [4] and hypergraph states [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] are especially useful in (blind) measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC) [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , quantum error correction [21, 22] , quantum networks [23] [24] [25] , and foundation studies [26] [27] [28] [29] . Another important class of multipartite states, including Dicke states [30, 31] , are useful in quantum metrology [32] . Furthermore, multipartite states, such as tensor-network states, also have extensive applications in research areas beyond quantum information science, including condensed matter physics [33, 34] .
To unleash the potential of multipartite quantum states in quantum information processing, it is paramount to prepare and verify these states with high precision using limited resources. To verify quantum states with traditional tomography [35] , however, the resource required increases exponentially with the number of qubits. Although compressed sensing [36] and direct fidelity estimation (DFE) [37] can improve the efficiency, the scaling behavior cannot be changed in general. As another alternative, self-testing [16, 38, 39] is also quite * zhuhuangjun@fudan.edu.cn resource consuming although it is conceptually appealing from the perspective of device independence.
Recently, a powerful approach known as quantum state verification (QSV) has attracted increasing attention [40] [41] [42] . Efficient verification protocols have been constructed for bipartite pure states [40, 41, [43] [44] [45] [46] , GreenbergerHorne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states [47] , stabilizer states (including graph states) [14-16, 25, 42] , hypergraph states [48] , weighted graph states [49] , and Dicke states [50] . By contrast, the situation is more troublesome when we turn to the adversarial scenario, in which the quantum states of interest are controlled by an untrusted party, Eve. Efficient QSV in such adversarial scenario is crucial to many applications in quantum information processing that require high security conditions, including blind MBQC [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] and quantum networks [23] [24] [25] . Unfortunately, no efficient approach is known for addressing such adversarial scenario in general. For example, to verify the simplest nontrivial hypergraph states (say of three qubits) already requires an astronomical number of measurements [19, 51] . What is worse, little is known about the resource cost of a given verification strategy to achieve a given precision [51, 52] . As a consequence, no general guideline is known for constructing an efficient verification strategy or for comparing the efficiencies of different strategies.
In this paper we initiate a systematic study of purestate verification in the adversarial scenario. In particular, we introduce a general method for determining the minimal number of tests required by a given verification strategy to achieve a given precision. We also introduce the concept of homogeneous strategies, which play a key role in QSV. Thanks to their high symmetry, we can derive analytical formulas for most figures of merit of practical interest. The conditions for single-copy verification are also clarified. Furthermore, we provide a general recipe to constructing efficient verification protocols for the adversarial scenario from verification protocols for the nonadversarial scenario. By virtue of this recipe, we can verify pure quantum states in the adversarial scenario with nearly the same efficiency as in the nonadversarial scenario. For high-precision verification, the overhead in the number of tests is at most three times. In this way, pure-state verification in the adversarial scenario can be greatly simplified since it suffices to focus on the nonadversarial scenario and then apply our recipe. In addition, our study reveals that entangling measurements are less helpful and often unnecessary in improving the verification efficiency in the adversarial scenario, which is counterintuitive at first sight 1 . Our work is especially helpful to the verification of bipartite pure states [40, 41, [43] [44] [45] [46] , GHZ states [47] , stabilizer states (including graph states) [42, 48] , hypergraph states [48] , weighted graph states [49] , and Dicke states [50] , for which efficient verification protocols for the nonadversarial scenario have been constructed recently. By virtue of our recipe, all these states can be verified in the adversarial scenario with much higher efficiencies than was possible previously. For bipartite pure states, even optimal protocols can be constructed.
This paper is an extended version of the companion paper [1] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we review the basic framework of QSV in the nonadversarial scenario. In Sec. III, we clarify the limitations of previous approaches to QSV and motivate the current study. In Sec. IV, we formulate the general ideal of QSV in the adversarial scenario and introduce the main figures of merit. In Sec. V, we introduce a general method for computing the main figures of merit in the adversarial scenario. In Sec. VI, we discuss in detail QSV with homogeneous strategies. In Sec. VII, we clarify the power of a single test in QSV. In Sec. VIII, we determine the minimal number of tests required by a general verification strategy to achieve a given precision. In Sec. IX, we propose a general recipe to constructing efficient verification protocols for the adversarial scenario from protocols devised for the nonadversarial scenario. In Sec. X, we demonstrate the power of our recipe via its applications to many important bipartite and multipartite quantum states. In Sec. XI, we compare QSV with a number of other approaches for estimating or verifying quantum states. Section XII summarizes this paper. To streamline the presentation, most technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
II. SETTING THE STAGE
In this section we first review the basic framework of QSV in the nonadversarial scenario. The main results presented here were established by Pallister, Linden, and Montanaro (PLM) [42] , but we have simplified the derivation. These results will serve as a benchmark for understanding pure-state verification in the adversarial scenario, which is the main focus of this paper. Then we discuss the connection between QSV and fidelity estimation.
A. Verification of pure states: Nonadversarial scenario
Consider a device that is supposed to produce the target state |Ψ in the (generally multipartite) Hilbert space H. In practice, the device may actually produce σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ N in N runs. Following Ref. [42] , here we assume that the fidelity Ψ|σ j |Ψ either equals 1 for all j or satisfies Ψ|σ j |Ψ ≤ 1 − ǫ for all j (the limitation of this assumption will be analyzed in Sec. III). Now the task is to determine which is the case.
To achieve this task we can perform N tests and accept the states produced if and only if (iff) all tests are passed. Each test is specified by a two-outcome measurement {E l , 1 − E l } chosen randomly from a set of accessible measurements. The test operator E l corresponds to passing the test. We assume that the target state |Ψ can always pass the test, that is, E l |Ψ = |Ψ for each E l . A verification strategy is characterized by all the tests E l and the probabilities µ l for performing these tests.
To determine the maximal probability of failing to reject the bad case, it is convenient to introduce the verification operator Ω := l µ l E l . As we shall see later, most key properties of a verification strategy is determined by the verification operator Ω, irrespective of how the test operators are constructed. Therefore, Ω is also referred to as a strategy when there is no danger of confusion. By construction, the target state |Ψ is an eigenstate of Ω with the largest eigenvalue 1. When Ψ|σ j |Ψ ≤ 1 − ǫ, by contrast, the maximal probability that σ j can pass a test on average is given by [42] (see Appendix A for a simple derivation) max Ψ|σ|Ψ ≤1−ǫ tr(Ωσ) = 1 − [1 − β(Ω)]ǫ = 1 − ν(Ω)ǫ, (1) where the maximization in the left hand side runs over all quantum states σ that satisfy the fidelity constraint Ψ|σ|Ψ ≤ 1 − ǫ. Here β(Ω) is the second largest eigenvalue of Ω, and ν(Ω) := 1 − β(Ω) is the spectral gap from the maximal eigenvalue. Note that β(Ω) is equal to the operator norm of Ω − |Ψ Ψ|, that is, β(Ω) = Ω − |Ψ Ψ| .
After N runs, σ j in the bad case can pass all tests with probability at most [1 − ν(Ω) 
ǫ]
N . This is also the maximal probability that the verification strategy fails to detect the bad case. To achieve significance level δ (confidence level 1 − δ), that is, [1 − ν(Ω)ǫ] N ≤ δ, the minimum number of tests is given by [42] N NA (ǫ, δ, Ω) = 1
This number is the main figure of merit of concern in QSV because to a large extent it determines the resource costs of implementing the verification strategy Ω. Note that a single test is sufficient if
According to Eq. (2), the efficiency of the strategy Ω is determined by the spectral gap ν(Ω). The optimal protocol is obtained by maximizing the spectral gap ν(Ω). If there is no restriction on the accessible measurements, then the optimal protocol is composed of the projective measurement {|Ψ Ψ|, 1 − |Ψ Ψ|}, in which case we have Ω = |Ψ Ψ| and ν(Ω) = 1, so that
In addition, the requirement in Eq. (3) reduces to
This efficiency cannot be improved further even if we can perform collective measurements. In particular, the scaling behaviors of ǫ −1 ln δ −1 with ǫ and δ are the best we can expect.
In practice, quite often the target state |Ψ is entangled, but it is not easy to perform entangling measurements. It is therefore crucial to devise efficient verification protocols based on local operations and classical communication (LOCC). Here by "efficient" we mean that the protocols can be applied in practice with reasonable resource costs, which is a much stronger requirement than what is usually understood in computer science. Ideally, the inverse spectral gap 1/ν(Ω) should be independent of the system size (the number of qubits say) or grow no faster than a low-order polynomial. In addition, the coefficients should be reasonably small. It turns out many important quantum states in quantum information processing can be verified efficiently with respect to these stringent criteria. Besides the total number N of tests determined by ǫ, δ, and ν(Ω), the number of potential measurement settings is also of concern if it is difficult to switch measurement settings. Nevertheless, most of our results in Sec. II-IX are independent of the specific details (including the number of potential measurement settings) of a verification protocol once the verification operator is fixed.
Here, we compare the approach presented above with previous works Refs. [40, 41] . In mathematical statistics, we often discuss hypothesis testing in the framework of uniformly most powerful test among a certain class of tests. In this case, we fix a certain set of states S 0 , and impose to our test the condition that the probability of erroneously rejecting states in S 0 is upper bounded by a certain value δ ′ ≥ 0. Under this condition, we maximize the probability of detecting a state σ in S c . When a test maximizes the probability uniformly for every state σ in S c , it is called a uniformly most powerful (UMP) test. However, since the detecting probability depends on the state σ, such a test does not exist in general. In this paper, S 0 and δ ′ are chosen to be {|Ψ } and 0, respectively. We consider the case in which the same strategy Ω is applied N times. Since we support the state |Ψ only when all our outcomes correspond to the pass eigenspace of Ω, our test is UMP under this case.
When the set S 0 is chosen as {σ| Ψ|σ|Ψ ≥ 1 − ǫ ′ }, and δ ′ is a non-zero value, the problem is more complicated. Such a setting arises when we allow a certain amount of error. To resolve this problem, imposing a certain symmetric condition to our tests, Refs. [40, 41] discussed several optimization problems and investigated their asymptotic behaviors when |Ψ is a maximally entangled state.
B. Connection with fidelity estimation
When all states σ j are identical to σ, let F = Ψ|σ|Ψ be the fidelity between σ and the target state |Ψ ; then we have (6) where τ (Ω) is the smallest eigenvalue of Ω. Therefore,
So the passing probability tr(Ωσ) provides upper and lower bounds for the infidelity (and fidelity). In general, Eqs. (6) and (7) still hold if F and tr(Ωσ) are replaced by the averages over all σ j . Note that the inequalities in Eqs. (6) and (7) are saturated when τ (Ω) = β(Ω); such strategies are called homogeneous and are discussed in more detail in Sec. VI. In this case we have
So the fidelity with the target state can be estimated from the passing probability. The standard deviation of this estimation reads
where p = tr(Ωσ) = νF + β ≥ F and N is the number of tests performed. Note that this standard deviation decreases monotonically with ν and N . This conclusion is related to the testing of binomial distributions discussed in Ref. [41] . When F ≥ 1/2, which is the case of most interest, we also have
given that p ≥ F .
III. VERIFICATION OF PURE STATES: A CRITICAL REEXAMINATION
In this section we reexamine the framework of QSV proposed by PLM [42] as summarized in Sec. II A above and clarify the limitation of this framework. In addition, we show that the limitation can be eliminated when states prepared in different runs are independent. The situation is much more complicated when these states are correlated, which motivates the study of QSV in the adversarial scenario presented in the rest of this paper.
A. What is verified in QSV?
Consider a device that is supposed to produce the target state |Ψ in the Hilbert space H. In practice, the device may actually produce σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ N in N runs. In the framework of PLM, it is assumed that the fidelity Ψ|σ j |Ψ either equals 1 for all j or satisfies Ψ|σ j |Ψ ≤ 1 − ǫ for all j [42] . In the i.i.d. case, all σ j are identical, so the PLM assumption is actually not necessary (or automatically guaranteed) to derive the conclusions presented in Sec. II A. If we drop the i.i.d. assumption, then the assumption of PLM is quite unnatural and difficult to guarantee. Moreover, the conclusion on QSV drawn based on this assumption is much weaker than what the word "verify" usually conveys. Suppose the test E l is performed with probability µ l and Ω = l µ l E l as in Sec. II A. After N tests are passed, we can only conclude that the probability of passing N tests is at most
In other words, passing these tests only confirm that Ψ|σ j |Ψ > 1 − ǫ for at least one run j with significance level
N . Such a weak conclusion is usually far from enough in practice. Note that the property of each run on average is more relevant if we want to make sure that the device works as expected most of the time rather than occasionally.
B. Independent state preparation
Fortunately we can drop the PLM assumption and draw a stronger conclusion as long as all states σ j are prepared independently of each other. Note that we do not need the i.i.d. assumption. The variation in σ j over different runs may be caused by inevitable imperfections of the device or fluctuations in various relevant parameters for example. Proposition 1. Suppose the N states σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ N are independent of each other. Then the probability that they can pass all N tests associated with the strategy Ω satisfies
whereǭ = j ǫ j /N with ǫ j = 1 − Ψ|σ j |Ψ is the average infidelity.
This proposition guarantees that the average fidelity satisfies j Ψ|σ j |Ψ /N > 1 − ǫ with significance level δ = (1 − ǫ) N if N tests are passed. To verify |Ψ within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ, the minimum number of tests reads
(12) This formula is identical to the one in Eq. (2), but it does not rely on the unnatural assumption imposed by PLM [42] . Accordingly, the meaning of "verification" is different. Here we can verify the average fidelity of the states σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . σ N prepared by the device rather than the maximal fidelity.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Here the first inequality follows from Eq. (1) and is saturated iff each σ j is supported in the subspace associated with the largest and second largest eigenvalues of Ω. The second inequality follows from the familiar inequality between the geometric mean and arithmetic mean and is saturated iff all ǫ j are equal toǭ; that is, all σ j have the same fidelity (and infidelity) with the target state. Note that variation in σ j cannot increase the passing probability once the average infidelityǭ is fixed.
C. Correlated state preparation
Here we show that the conclusion in Secs. II A and III B will fail if the states σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ N are correlated. As a special example, suppose the device produces the ideal target state (|Ψ Ψ|) ⊗N in N runs with probability 0 < a < 1 and the alternative σ ⊗N with probability 1−a, where Ψ|σ|Ψ = 1 − ǫ ′ < 1. The reduced state of each party reads a(|Ψ Ψ|)+(1−a)σ and its infidelity with the target state is ǫ = (1−a)ǫ ′ . Note that the device can pass N tests with probability at least a no matter how large N is. So it is impossible to verify the target state within infidelity ǫ = (1 − a)ǫ ′ and significance level δ < a using the approach presented in Sec. II A or that in Sec. III B. This observation reveals another limitation of the PLM framework of QSV. To overcome this difficulty, we need to consider a different framework of QSV as formulated in the next section.
IV. QUANTUM STATE VERIFICATION IN THE ADVERSARIAL SCENARIO
Now we turn to the adversarial scenario in which the device for generating quantum states is controlled by a potentially malicious adversary. In this case the device may produce arbitrary correlated or even entangled states. Efficient verification of quantum states in such adversarial scenario is crucial to many quantum information-processing tasks that entail high security requirements, such as blind quantum computation [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] and quantum networks [23] [24] [25] . However, little is known about this topic in the literature. The approach of PLM does not work as illustrated by the example of correlated state preparation in Sec. III C. Most other studies in the literature only focus on specific families of states, such as graph states [14] [15] [16] 25] and hypergraph states [19, 51] . In addition, known protocols are too resource consuming to be applied in practice, especially for hypergraph states, in which case the best protocol known in the literature requires an astronomical number of tests already for three-qubit hypergraph states. The difficulty in constructing efficient verification protocols in the adversarial scenario is tied to the fact that even for a given protocol, no efficient method is available for determining the minimal resource cost necessary to reach the target precision.
In this section we introduce a general framework of pure state verification in the adversarial scenario together with the main figures of merit. The basic ideas presented here will serve as a stepping stone for the following discussions.
A. Formulation
To establish a reliable and efficient framework for verifying pure states in the adversarial scenario, first note that the verification and application of a quantum state cannot be completely separated in the adversarial scenario. Otherwise, the device may produce ideal target states in the verification stage and so can always pass the tests, but produce a garbage state in the application stage. To resolve this problem, suppose the device produces an arbitrary correlated or entangled state ρ on the whole system H ⊗(N +1) . Our goal is to ensure that the reduced state on one system has infidelity less than ǫ by performing N tests on other systems. We can randomly choose N systems and apply a verification strategy Ω to each system chosen and accept the state on the remaining system iff all N tests are passed. Since N systems are chosen randomly, we may assume that ρ is permutation invariant without loss of generality.
Suppose the strategy Ω is applied to the first N systems, then the probability that ρ can pass N tests reads
The reduced state on system N + 1 (assuming p ρ > 0) is given by
where tr 1,2,...,N means the partial trace over the systems 1, 2, . . . , N . The fidelity between σ ′ N +1 and the target state |Ψ reads
where
When ρ = σ ⊗(N +1) is a tensor power of the state σ with
These conclusions coincide with the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario as expected. The situation is different if ρ does not have this form. Suppose ρ = a(|Ψ Ψ|)
with 0 < a < 1 for example; cf. Sec. III C. If N tests are passed, then the reduced state of party N + 1 reads
and decreases exponentially with N . Therefore, the infidelity 1− Ψ|σ ′ N +1 |Ψ approaches zero exponentially with N even if a is arbitrarily small. In other words, if the infidelity is bounded from below 1 − Ψ|σ ′ N +1 |Ψ ≥ ǫ for 0 < ǫ < 1, then a should approach zero as N increases; accordingly, the passing probability will approach zero. This observation indicates that we can verify the target state within any given infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ < 1 even when the states prepared are correlated, which demonstrates the advantage of the alternative approach presented above over the PLM approach. In the rest of this paper we will show that indeed it is possible to verify pure states efficiently even if the device is controlled by the adversary and produces arbitrarily correlated or even entangled states allowed by quantum mechanics.
B. Main figures of merit
To characterize the performance of the strategy Ω applied to the adversarial scenario, here we introduce four figures of merit. Define
where N ≥ 1 is the number of tests performed. The four figures of merit are closely related to each other, as we shall see later. In practice F (N, δ, Ω) is a main figure of merit of interest; it denotes the minimum fidelity of the state on the remaining party (with the target state), assuming that ρ can pass N tests with significance level at least δ. By definition F (N, δ, Ω) and ζ(N, δ, Ω) are nondecreasing in δ, while F (N, f, Ω) and η(N, f, Ω) are nondecreasing in f . A simple upper bound for F (N, δ, Ω) can be derived by considering quantum states ρ that can be expressed as tensor powers in Eq. (20c), which yields
The four figures of merit defined in Eq. (20) are tied to the two-dimensional region composed of all the points (p ρ , f ρ ) for density matrices ρ, that is,
This geometric picture will be very helpful to understanding QSV in the adversarial scenario. By definition the region R N,Ω is convex since the state space is convex, and p ρ , f ρ are both linear in ρ. What is not so obvious at the moment is that the region R N,Ω is actually a convex polygon. In addition to characterizing the verification precision that is achievable for a given number N of tests, it is equally important to determine the minimum number of tests required to reach a given precision. To this end, we define N (ǫ, δ, Ω) as the minimum value of N that satisfies the condition
As an implication of Eq. (21), we have
as expected since it is much more difficult to verify a quantum state in the adversarial scenario than nonadversarial scenario. Then how much overhead is required in the adversarial scenario? Can we achieve the same scaling behaviors in ǫ and δ?
In general it is very difficult to derive an analytical formula for N (ǫ, δ, Ω) if not impossible. Therefore, it is nontrivial to determine the efficiency limit of QSV in the adversarial scenario even if three is no restriction on the accessible measurements, or even if the target state belongs to a single party, which is in sharp contrast with QSV in the nonadversarial scenario. Indeed, it took a long time and a lot of efforts to settle these problems.
V. COMPUTATION OF THE VERIFICATION PRECISION
In this section we develop a general method for computing the figures of merit defined in Eq. (20) , which characterize the verification precision in the adversarial scenario. We also clarify the properties of these figures of merit in preparation for latter study. Both algebraic derivation and geometric pictures will be helpful in our analysis.
A. Key observations
Suppose the verification operator Ω for the target state |Ψ ∈ H has spectral decomposition Ω = D j=1 λ j Π j , where λ j are the eigenvalues of Ω arranged in decreasing order 1 = λ 1 > λ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ D , and Π j are mutually orthogonal rank-1 projectors with Π 1 = |Ψ Ψ|. Here the second largest eigenvalue β := λ 2 and the smallest eigenvalue τ := λ D deserve special attention because they determine the performance of Ω to a large extent, as we shall see later. Suppose the adversary produces the state ρ on the whole system H ⊗(N +1) , which is permutation invariant (cf. Sec. IV). Without loss of generality, we may assume that ρ is diagonal in the product basis constructed from the eigenbasis of Ω (as determined by the projectors Π j ), since p ρ , f ρ , and F ρ only depend on the diagonal elements of ρ.
Let S N be the set of all such sequences. For each k ∈ S N , we can define a permutation-invariant diagonal density matrix ρ k on H ⊗(N +1) as the uniform mixture of all permutations of Π
Then any permutation-invariant diagonal density matrix ρ on H ⊗(N +1) can be expressed as ρ = k∈SN c k ρ k , where c k form a probability distribution on S N . Accordingly, The region RN,Ω composed of (pρ, fρ) as defined in Eq. (22) . This region is the convex hull of points (η k (λ), ζ k (λ)) for k ∈ SN , which are highlighted as red dots.
Here Ω has three distinct eigenvalues, namely, 1, 0.4, and 0.2.
where λ := (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ D ) and
Here we set λ
the second inequality is saturated iff k = k 0 := (N + 1, 0, . . . , 0), in which case both inequalities are saturated, that is, ζ k0 (λ) = η k0 (λ) = 1. As an implication, we have f ρ ≤ p ρ ≤ 1, and the second inequality is saturated iff ρ = ρ k0 = (|Ψ Ψ|) ⊗(N +1) , in which case f ρ = p ρ = 1. This observation implies that
By contrast, η k (λ) ≥ τ N , and the lower bound is saturated when k = (0, . . . , 0, N + 1). Accordingly, p ρ ≥ τ N , and the lower bound is saturated when ρ = Π ⊗(N +1) D . In view of the above discussion, the region R N,Ω defined in Eq. (22) is the convex hull of (η k (λ), ζ k (λ)) for all k ∈ S N , which is a polygon, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . It should be emphasized that R N,Ω only depends on the distinct eigenvalues of Ω, but not on their degeneracies (though λ 1 is not degenerate by assumption). The same conclusion also applies to the figures of merit F (N, δ, Ω),
, and η(N, f, Ω) defined in Eq. (20) given that they are completely determined by the region R N,Ω . For example, F (N, δ, Ω) corresponds to the lower boundary of the intersection of R N,Ω and the vertical line p ρ = δ as long as δ ≥ τ N . This geometric picture is very helpful to understanding the properties of F (N, δ, Ω), although in general it is not easy to find an explicit analytical formula. As N increases, the region R N,Ω concentrates more and more around the diagonal defined by the equation f = p as illustrated in Fig. 1 , which means F (N, δ, Ω) approaches 1 as N increases.
Denote by σ(Ω) the set of distinct eigenvalues of Ω. If Ω ′ is another verification operator for |Ψ with β(Ω ′
Then Ω ′ is more efficient than Ω in the sense that
This observation is instructive to constructing efficient verification protocols, as we shall see in Sec. VI.
B. Computation of the main figures of merit
Here we show that the four figures of merit ζ(N, δ, Ω), η(N, f, Ω), F (N, δ, Ω), and F (N, f, Ω) can be computed by linear programming; Lemmas 1 and 2 below are proved in Appendix B. To start with, we first determine η(N, 0, Ω), the maximum of p ρ under the condition f ρ = 0. 
Lemma 1 has implications for the figures of merit F (N, δ, Ω) and ζ(N, δ, Ω) as well,
Next, we introduce alternative definitions of the figures of merit defined in Eq. (20) , which are easier to analyze and compute. Definẽ
To compute F (N, δ, Ω) and F (N, f, Ω), it suffices to compute ζ(N, δ, Ω) and η(N, f, Ω). By virtue of Eq. (25) and Lemma 2, ζ(N, δ, Ω) with δ c ≤ δ ≤ 1 and η(N, f, Ω) with 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 can be computed via linear programming,
Here the minimum in Eq. (38a) can be attained at a distribution {c k } that is supported on at most two points in S N ; a similar conclusion holds for the maximum in Eq. (38b). These conclusions are tied to the geometric fact that any boundary point of R N,Ω lies on a line segment that connects two extremal points. This observation can greatly simplify the computation of F (N, δ, Ω) and F (N, f, Ω) as well as ζ(N, δ, Ω) and η(N, f, Ω). In addition to the computational value, Eq. (38) implies that ζ(N, δ, Ω) and η(N, f, Ω) are piecewise linear functions, whose turning points correspond to the extremal points of the region R N,Ω and have the form (η k (λ), ζ k (λ)) for some k ∈ S N ; cf. Lemma 13 in Appendix B.
C. Properties of the main figures of merit
Next, we summarize the main properties of the five figures of merit ζ(N, δ, Ω), η(N, f, Ω), F (N, δ, Ω), F (N, f, Ω), and N (ǫ, δ, Ω); the proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
Lemma 3. The following statements hold.
1. ζ(N, δ, Ω) is convex in δ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and is strictly increasing in δ for δ c ≤ δ ≤ 1.
2. η(N, f, Ω) is concave and strictly increasing in f for 0 ≤ f ≤ 1.
Note that the two functions ζ(N, δ, Ω) and F (N, δ, Ω) are nondecreasing in δ over the whole interval 0 < δ ≤ 1, given that they are nonnegative and that F (N, δ, Ω) = ζ(N, δ, Ω) = 0 for 0 < δ ≤ δ c . This conclusion also follows from the definitions in Eq. (20) .
Lemma 5. Suppose N ≥ 2 and 0 < δ, f ≤ 1. Then
The first two inequalities are saturated iff δ ≤ δ c or δ = 1, where δ c is given in Eq. (31) . The last two inequalities are saturated iff f = 1.
Finally, we turn to the figure of merit N (ǫ, δ, Ω) defined in Eq. (23) . As an implication of Lemma 3, N (ǫ, δ, Ω) increases monotonically with 1/ǫ and 1/δ as expected.
The following lemma provides several equivalent ways for computing N (ǫ, δ, Ω).
VI. HOMOGENEOUS STRATEGIES
A strategy (or verification operator) Ω for |Ψ is homogeneous if it has the form
where 0 ≤ λ < 1. In this case, all eigenvalues of Ω are equal to λ except for the largest one, so we have β = τ = λ and ν = 1 − λ. Incidentally, the homogeneous strategy Ω can always be realized by performing the test P = |Ψ Ψ| with probability 1−λ and the trivial test with probability λ. By "trivial test" we mean the test projector is equal to the identity operator. For bipartite pure states [40, 41, 43, 44] and stabilizer states [42] , the homogeneous strategy can also be realized by virtue of local projective measurements when λ is sufficiently large. In the nonadversarial scenario, a smaller λ achieves a better performance among homogeneous strategies. Here, we clarify what λ is optimal in the adversarial scenario, which turns out to be very different from the nonadversarial scenario.
Given that the homogeneous strategy Ω in Eq. (45) is determined by the parameter λ, it is more informative to express the figures of merit defined in Eqs. (20) and (23) as follows,
Then Lemma 1 implies that
SupposeΩ is an arbitrary verification operator with (30) . Therefore, the optimal performance can always be achieved by a homogeneous strategy if there is no restriction on the accessible measurements. This observation reveals the importance of homogeneous strategies to QSV in the adversarial scenario.
In preparation for the following discussions, we need to introduce a few more notations. Denote by Z and Z
≥0
the set of integers and the set of nonnegative integers, respectively. For k ∈ Z ≥0 , define
We take the convention that
when k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N + 1}, where
, and η k (λ), ζ k (λ) are defined in Eq. (27) . The extension of the definitions of η k (λ) and ζ k (λ) over k to the set Z ≥0 will be useful in proving several important results on homogeneous strategies.
A. The singular homogeneous strategy
When λ = 0, the verification operator Ω = |Ψ Ψ| is singular, and Eq. (48) reduces to
The minimum number of tests required to verify the pure state |Ψ within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ reads
Here the scaling with 1/δ is suboptimal although the strategy is optimal for the nonadversarial scenario according to Eqs. (2) and (12) . Fortunately, nonsingular homogeneous strategies can achieve a better scaling behavior, as we shall see shortly.
B. Nonsingular homogeneous strategies
Verification precision
Here we assume 0 < λ < 1, so the homogeneous strategy defined in Eq. (45) is nonsingular. In this case, η k (λ) decreases strictly monotonically with k for k ∈ Z ≥0 , and ζ k (λ) decreases strictly monotonically with k for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N + 1}. Define
where ν = 1 − λ. The following theorem clarifies the precision that can be achieved by a given number of tests; see Appendix C 2 for a proof.
where k * is the largest integer k that satisfies
The choice of the parameter k * in Theorem 1 guarantees that 0 < c k * (δ, λ) ≤ 1. Given the assumption λ N < δ ≤ 1, we can deduce from Eq. (48) that k * is equal to either k + or k − , where
When k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N }, Theorem 1 implies that
which decreases monotonically with k. In particular we have
which also decreases monotonically with k. The dependences of ζ(N, δ, λ) and F (N, δ, λ) on δ and λ are illustrated in Fig. 2 . Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 1 above and Lemma 16 in Appendix C. Equation (59) provides a family of lower bounds for ζ(N, δ, λ), namely,
Corollary 2 follows from Eq. (51) and Theorem 1; alternatively, it follows from Lemmas 3 and 5. Corollary 3 is an immediate consequence of Corollary 2 and Eq. (57).
Number of required tests
Now, we are ready to determine the minimum number of tests required to verify the pure state |Ψ within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ in the adversarial scenario. 
where F = 1 − ǫ and ν = 1 − λ. where k * is the largest integer k that satisfies the inequal-
According to Eq. (64) above and Lemma 17 in Appendix C, N (ǫ, δ, λ) ≥ k * and it is nonincreasing in ǫ and δ as expected. Suppose k is a positive integer, then it is straightforward to verify thatÑ
given that λ < F + λǫ < 1. So k * in Eq. (64) is equal to either k + or k − . Thanks to this observation, N (ǫ, δ, λ) can also be expressed as follows,
(68)
where the upper bound for a given k is saturated when Corollary 4 is an easy consequence of Theorem 2. The two cases k = 0, 1 are of special interest,
If λ/(F + λǫ) ≤ δ < 1, then Eq. (70) is saturated, so we have
This result also holds when λ = 0 (as long as 0 < δ < 1)
where the lower bound is proved in Appendix C 2. Equations (72) and (73) show that homogeneous strategies with small λ, say λ ≤ 0.1, are not efficient for highprecision QSV (say ǫ, δ ≤ 0.1), as reflected in Fig. 4 .
The following theorem provides informative bounds for N (ǫ, δ, λ), which complement the analytical formula in Theorem 2.
All three bounds in Eqs. (74) and (75) are saturated when log λ δ is an integer.
On the other hand, by virtue of Eq. (74), we can derive
The exact value of lim ǫ→0 ǫN (ǫ, δ, λ) can be derived from Eq. (67), with the result
note that the inequality δ ≥ λ k+ /(F + λǫ) is always satisfied in the limit ǫ → 0 if log λ δ is not an integer.
C. Optimal homogeneous strategies 1. Optimal strategies in the high precision limit ǫ, δ → 0
In the adversarial scenario, the optimal performance can always be achieved by a homogeneous strategy if there is no restriction on the measurements. However, the value of λ that minimizes N (ǫ, δ, λ) depends on the target precision, as characterized by ǫ and δ. We cannot find a homogeneous strategy that is optimal for all ǫ and δ, unlike the nonadversarial scenario. Here we are mostly interested in the high precision limit, which means ǫ, δ → 0.
According to Eq. (79), in the high-precision limit, the minimum number of tests can be approximated as follows,
To understand the condition of this approximation, note that k ± ≈ log λ δ if δ ≪ λ, which is usually the case in high-precision verification. If in addition ǫ ≪ 1, then the ratio of the lower bound over the upper bound in Eq. (74) is close to 1, so that the two bounds are nearly tight with respect to the relative deviation. In this case, Eq. (81) Fig. 4 ; in addition, they are not so important due to the reasons explained in Sec. IX later. Thanks to Theorems 2 and 3, the number of tests required by any nonsingular homogeneous strategy can achieve the same scaling behaviors with ǫ and δ as the counterpart in the nonadversarial scenario for highprecision QSV. In the limit ǫ, δ → 0, the efficiency is characterized by the function (λ ln λ −1 ) −1 . Analysis shows that the function (λ ln λ −1 ) −1 is convex for 0 < λ < 1 and attains the minimum e when λ = 1/e, with e being the base of the natural logarithm. It is strictly decreasing in λ when 0 < λ ≤ 1/e and strictly increasing when 1/e ≤ λ < 1; cf. Fig. 4 . Therefore, the homogeneous strategy with λ = 1/e, that is, ν = 1 − (1/e), is optimal in the high-precision limit ǫ, δ → 0 if there is no restriction on the accessible measurements. In this case we have
Compared with the minimum number ǫ −1 ln δ −1 for the nonadversarial scenario, the overhead is only e times.
Although we cannot find a value of λ that is optimal for all ǫ and δ, the optimal value usually lies in a neighborhood, say [0.32, 0.38], of 1/e for the values of ǫ and δ that are of practical interest, say ǫ, δ ≤ 0.1. In addition, N (ǫ, δ, λ) varies quite slowly with λ in this neighborhood, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . So the choice λ = 1/e is usually nearly optimal even if it is not optimal.
The above analysis shows that the optimal strategies for the adversarial scenario are very different from the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario. As a consequence, entangling measurements are less helpful and often unnecessary for constructing the optimal strategies in the case of bipartite and multipartite systems. In the case of bipartite pure states for example, the optimal strategies for high-precision verification can be realized by virtue of local projective measurements [40, 41, 43, 44] (cf. Sec. X).
2. Optimal strategies in the limit δ → 0
Here we discuss briefly the scenario in which δ → 0, but ǫ is not necessarily so small, which is relevant to entanglement detection [43] . According to Eq. (77), in this case, the performance of the homogeneous strategy Ω is characterized by where
For a given ǫ or F , the minimum of N (ǫ, λ) over λ is denoted by N * (ǫ). It is attained when λ = λ * (ǫ), where λ * (ǫ) is the unique solution of the equation
which amounts to the equality
It is not difficult to verify that λ * (ǫ) = 0 when ǫ = 1 (F = 0) and λ * (ǫ) = 1/e when ǫ = 0 (F = 1); in addition, λ * (ǫ) decreases monotonically with ǫ and is concave in ǫ, as illustrated in Fig. 5 . Therefore,
Next, we study the dependence of the efficiency on the parameter λ. As a benchmark, we choose the homogeneous strategy with λ = 1/e in which case we have
Straightforward calculation shows that
When λ < 1/e,N (ǫ, λ) decreases monotonically with ǫ, so we have
In addition, a homogeneous strategy Ω with a small value of λ could be significantly more efficient than the benchmark when ǫ is large. When λ > 1/e, by contrast,N (ǫ, λ) increases monotonically with ǫ, so we have
Finally, by virtue of Eqs. (83) and (86) we can derive the following equality,
According to the analysis on λ * (ǫ), we can deduce that N * (ǫ) decreases monotonically with ǫ; it approaches 1 in the limit ǫ → 0, while it approaches 0 (quite slowly) in the limit ǫ → 1, as illustrated in Fig. 5 . AlthoughN * (ǫ) could be arbitrarily small when ǫ is large, it is close to 1 when ǫ is not too large. For example,N * (ǫ) ≥ 0.965 when ǫ ≤ 0.5 andN * (ǫ) ≥ 0.999 when ǫ ≤ 0.1. Therefore, the homogeneous strategy Ω with β(Ω) = 1/e is nearly optimal for most parameter range of practical interest, as pointed out earlier.
VII. SINGLE-COPY VERIFICATION
In this section we analyze the possibility of QSV in the adversarial scenario using a single test. This problem is of intrinsic interest to single-copy entanglement detection [43, 53] . Given a verification strategy Ω, the state |Ψ can be verified within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ < 1 using a single test iff
Since F (N, δ, Ω) = ζ(N, δ, Ω)/δ according to Eq. (36), the above equation is equivalent to
So our main task here is to determine ζ(N, δ, λ) in the case N = 1. In the rest of this section we assume N = 1 except when stated otherwise. Note that the range of δ of practical interest usually satisfies 0 < δ ≤ 1/2.
A. Single-copy verification with homogeneous strategies
First, let us consider the homogeneous strategy Ω defined in Eq. (45) .
Proposition 2 follows from Eq. (51) when λ = 0 and follows from Theorem 2 when 0 < λ < 1. Equation (95) above can also be expressed as
Based on this expression, we can derive
Here the maximum is attained at
In addition, the optimal solution λ is unique for 0 < δ < 1 except when δ = 5/9, in which case there are two optimal solutions, namely, λ = 0 and λ = 1/3. Therefore, the target state can be verified within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ < 1 using a single test iff δ and ǫ satisfy the condition
Recall that the optimal strategy can always be chosen to be homogeneous if there is no restriction on the measurements.
Corollary 5. Given a homogeneous strategy Ω with β(Ω) = λ, the target state can be verified within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 in the adversarial scenario using a single test iff
This requirement is equivalent to the following conditions,
where Equation (100) above implies that 0 < λ < δ ≤ 1/2. Therefore, any homogeneous strategy Ω with β(Ω) = 0 or β(Ω) ≥ 1/2 cannot verify the target state within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 using a single test. This conclusion also applies to an arbitrary strategy, not necessarily homogeneous; see Corollary 6 below. The right hand side in Eq. (101) is monotonically decreasing in ǫ for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1. Given the assumption δ ≤ 1/2, Eq. (101) can be satisfied only if ǫ ≥ 2( √ 2 − 1). By computing the derivatives over δ, ǫ, it is easy to verify that λ + (λ − ) defined in Eq. (103) is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in δ and ǫ, which agrees with the intuition. In conjunction with the assumption δ ≤ 1/2, we conclude that
(104) Applying the inequality 4(1−ǫ)δ > 4(1−ǫ)δ 2 in Eq. (103), we can derive
B. Single-copy verification with general strategies
Next, we generalize Proposition 2 to an arbitrary verification operator Ω. The following theorem shows that the efficiency of Ω is determined by β and τ , where β and τ denote the second largest and the smallest eigenvalues of Ω, respectively. See Appendix D for a proof.
(107)
Corollary 6. The target state can be verified by the strategy Ω within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ ≤ 1/2 using a single test iff
When 0 < β < 1/2, we have
So Eq. (108) implies Eq. (100) with λ = β or λ = τ , which in turn implies Eq. (101) and the sequence of inequalities Corollary 7. The target state can be verified within infidelity 0 < ǫ < 1 and significance level 0 < δ < 1 in the adversarial scenario using a single test iff δ and ǫ satisfy the condition
When the lower bound is saturated, the target state can be verified within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ by a strategy Ω iff Ω is homogeneous and
When 0 < ǫ < 1 and ǫ = 4/5, the optimal strategy Ω in Corollary 7 is unique and the conclusion can be derived from Eq. (99) alone without resorting to Theorem 4. When ǫ = 4/5, there are two optimal strategies, both of which are homogeneous, and β(Ω) can take on two possible values, namely, β(Ω) = 0 and β(Ω) = 1/3.
The parameter range of single-copy verification in Eq. (110) contrasts with the counterpart in Eq. (5) for the nonadversarial scenario, as illustrated in Fig. 6 .
VIII. EFFICIENCIES OF GENERAL VERIFICATION STRATEGIES
In this section we present our main results on the efficiencies of general verification strategies. As we shall see shortly, the efficiency of a general verification operator Ω of a pure state |Ψ is mainly determined by its second largest eigenvalue β (or equivalently ν = 1 − β) and the smallest eigenvalue τ .
A. Singular verification strategies
The efficiency of a singular verification strategy is characterized by Lemma 7 and Theorem 5 below, which are proved in Appendix E. Define
Suppose Ω is a singular verification operator and 1/(N + 1) ≤ δ ≤ δ * . Then
Theorem 5. Suppose 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 < ν ≤ 1. Then
and the inequality is saturated when δ
and the inequality is saturated when Ω is singular and δ
The bound in Eq. (114) is positive and thus nontrivial if δ > 1/(N ν + 1), while the one in Eq. (115) is positive if δ > 1/(N + 1). The first bound is saturated and thus optimal when δ ≥ δ * , while the second bound is better when δ < δ * . The two bounds coincide when δ = δ * . The bound in Eq. (115) under the condition ν ≥ 1/2 was also given in Ref. [14] under a slightly different situation. According to Lemma 7 and Theorem 5, if Ω is singular, then
.
If ν ≥ 1/2, by contrast, then the above inequality is reversed,
If Ω is singular and meanwhile ν ≥ 1/2, then the inequalities in Eqs. (116) and (117) are saturated.
If Ω is singular, then [19, 51] . Nevertheless, the scaling with 1/δ is still suboptimal compared with the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario.
B. Nonsingular verification strategies
Next, we provide an even better bound on the number of tests when Ω is nonsingular. It should be pointed out that many results derived for homogeneous strategies cannot be applied directly to general strategies, so here we have to resort to a different approach. Lemma 8 and Theorem 6 below are proved in Appendix F.
Lemma 8. Suppose 0 < δ, f ≤ 1 and Ω is a positive definite verification operator. Then
Then we have h = β lnβ −1 −1 . Note that the lower bounds in Eqs. (122) and (123) increase monotonically with N , which is expected in view of Lemma 5. Lemma 8 is a key to studying QSV in the adversarial scenario.
Theorem 6. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ < 1 and Ω is a positive definite verification operator. Then
where λ j are the eigenvalues of Ω,
The upper bounds in Eq. (127) are worse than that in Eq. (128) if F < τ = τ (Ω), while they are better if F > τ , which is usually the case for high precision verification. Suppose τ is bounded from below by a positive constant. Then the ratio of the lower bound over the upper bound in Eq. (127) approaches 1 in the high-precision limit ǫ, δ → 0, so the two bounds are nearly tight, as in the case of homogeneous strategies. Therefore, N (ǫ, δ, Ω) can be approximated as follows,
The number of tests has the same scaling behaviors with ǫ −1 and δ −1 as the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario presented in Eqs. (2) and (12), except for an overhead characterized by νh. However, Ω is not efficient when τ is too small according to Eq. (126) as well as Eqs. (72) and (73). In addition, the scaling behavior with δ −1 would be worse if Ω were singular according to Eq. (119).
The above analysis can be extended to the scenario in which we want to verify whether the support of the resultant state belongs to a certain subspace K. In this case, we need to replace the projector |Ψ Ψ| by the projector P onto the subspace K, impose the condition E l P = P , and redefine f ρ as tr[(Ω ⊗N ⊗ P )ρ]. Such extension is useful when we want to verify whether the resultant state is correctable in a fault-tolerant way [15] .
IX. GENERAL RECIPE TO VERIFYING PURE STATES IN THE ADVERSARIAL SCENARIO
According to Sec. VIII, the number N (ǫ, δ, Ω) of tests required to verify a pure state in the adversarial scenario has the same scaling behavior with ǫ −1 and δ −1 as the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario as long as the verification operator Ω is nonsingular, and its smallest eigenvalue τ is bounded from below by a positive constant. However, the scaling behavior of N (ǫ, δ, Ω) with δ is suboptimal when Ω is singular, that is, τ = 0. Similarly, the efficiency is limited when τ is nonzero, but very small. Here we provide a simple recipe to reducing the number of tests significantly, so that pure states can be verified in the adversarial scenario with high precision and with nearly the same efficiency as in the nonadversarial scenario. Surprisingly, all we need to do is to perform the trivial test with a suitable probability. By "trivial test" we mean the test whose test projector P is equal to the identity operator, that is P = 1, so that all the states can pass the test with certainty.
A. The recipe
Suppose Ω is a verification operator for the pure state |Ψ . Based on Ω, we can construct a new verification operator as follows,
which means the trivial test is performed with probability 0 ≤ p < 1 and Ω is performed with probability 1 − p.
Denote by β p and τ p the second largest eigenvalue and smallest eigenvalue of Ω p , respectively. Then
where β and τ are the second largest eigenvalue and smallest eigenvalue of Ω, respectively, which satisfy the inequality τ ≤ β. Here we view β p as a function of ν = 1 − β and p. According to Sec. II, the trivial test can only decrease the efficiency in the nonadversarial scenario. In highprecision verification for example, the number of tests required by Ω p is about 1/(1 − p) times the number required by Ω according to Eqs. (2) and (12) . In sharp contrast, the trivial test can increase the efficiency in the adversarial scenario by hedging the influence of small eigenvalues of Ω. Therefore, Ω p is called a hedged verification operator of Ω.
By Eq. (127), to verify |Ψ within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ in the adversarial scenario, the number of tests required by the strategy Ω p (assuming τ p > 0) satisfies
Compared with the number in Eq. (2) for the nonadversarial scenario, the overhead is upper bounded as follows,
It is straightforward to verify that this bound decreases monotonically with 1/ǫ and 1/δ. It turns out that the bound also decreases monotonically with 1/ν according to Lemmas 9 and 10 below. When ǫ and δ approach zero, the bound in Eq. (132) becomes tight (with respect to the relative deviation) according to Eq. (127), so we have
This equation corroborates the significance of the function νh(p, ν, τ ) for characterizing the overhead of highprecision QSV in the adversarial scenario.
To construct an efficient hedged verification strategy, we need to choose a suitable value of p so as to minimize h(p, ν, τ ). Given the value of ν = 1 − β and τ with ν + τ ≤ 1, the minimum of h(p, ν, τ ) over p is denoted by h * (ν, τ ); the unique minimizer in p is denoted by p * (ν, τ ) or p * for simplicity; cf. Fig. 7 . By definition we have
In addition, it is straightforward to verify that
Here the condition β p ≥ e −1 is required when τ = β (so that Ω is a homogeneous strategy), but is redundant when τ < β. Equation (137) implies that β p * ≥ 1/e; by contrast, τ p * ≤ 1/e if τ ≤ 1/e.
When the strategy Ω is homogeneous, that is, when τ = β = 1 − ν, we have
In this case Ω p is also homogeneous, so the results presented in Sec. VI can be applied directly. In general, it is not easy to derive an analytical formula for p * , but it is very easy to determine p * numerically. 
(color online) The optimal probability p * (ν, τ ) for performing the trivial test (upper plot), the prefactor h * (ν, τ ) (middle plot), and the overhead νh * (ν, τ ) (lower plot) for high-precision QSV in the adversarial scenario.
B. Properties of hedged verification strategies
To determine the overhead of QSV in the adversarial scenario, we need to clarify the properties of h(p, ν, τ ), h * (ν, τ ), and p * (ν, τ ), which affect the performances of hedged verification strategies. To this end, it is instructive to recall that the function x ln x −1 is concave in the interval 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and is strictly increasing in x when 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/e, while it is strictly decreasing when 1/e ≤ x ≤ 1; it attains the maximum 1/e when x = 1/e. These observations yield a tight lower bound for h(p, ν, τ ), namely,
and the bound is saturated iff τ p = β p = 1/e, that is, τ = 1 − ν ≤ 1/e and p = (eν − e + 1)/(eν); cf. Eqs. (138) and (139).
Lemma 9. Suppose 0 < ν ≤ 1. Then p * (ν, 1 − ν) is nondecreasing in ν, h * (ν, 1 − ν) is nonincreasing in ν, and νh * (ν, 1 − ν) is strictly increasing in ν. Meanwhile, νh * (ν, 1 − ν) > 1 and lim ν→0 νh * (ν, 1 − ν) = 1. If in addition 0 ≤ p < 1 and β p = 1 − ν + pν > 0, then νh(p, ν, 1 − ν) is strictly increasing in ν. 1. p * (ν, τ ) is nondecreasing in ν and nonincreasing in τ .
2. h * (ν, τ ) is nonincreasing in both ν and τ .
3. νh * (ν, τ ) > 1.
4. lim ν→0 νh * (ν, τ ) = 1.
5. νh * (ν, τ ) is strictly increasing in ν.
If in addition 0 ≤ p < 1 and τ p = (1 − p)τ + p > 0, then 6. h(p, ν, τ ) is nonincreasing in both ν and τ .
7. νh(p, ν, τ ) is strictly increasing in ν.
Lemmas 9 and 10 are proved in Appendix G. In Lemma 10 we assume that ν and τ can vary independently, which means the Hilbert space H on which Ω acts has dimension at least 3. If H has dimension 2, then Ω is always homogeneous and τ = 1 − ν, so Lemma 10 is redundant given Lemma 9. Lemmas 9 and 10 summarize the main properties of p * (ν, τ ), h(p, ν, τ ), and h * (ν, τ ) as illustrated in Fig. 7 , which are very instructive to understanding QSV in the adversarial scenario. In particular Lemma 10 reveals that the overhead νh * (ν, τ ) in the number of tests becomes negligible when ν approaches 0. To be concrete, calculation shows that νh * (ν, τ ) ≤ 1.09, 1.19, 1.31, 1.45, 1.61 when ν ≤ 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, respectively.
When
the upper bound 1/e is saturated iff ν = 1 and τ = 0.
As a corollary, we have 1/[1 − p * (ν, τ )] ≤ e/(e − 1) < 1.6, so the number of tests required by Ω p * is at most 60% more than the number required by Ω for high-precision verification in the nonadversarial scenario although here we are mainly interested in the adversarial scenario. By contrast, Lemma 10 and Eq. (139) yield a lower bound for h * (ν, τ ),
When 0 < τ < β and τ ln τ
So there is no need to perform the trivial test. When τ ln τ −1 < β ln β −1 (including the case τ = 0), which implies that τ < 1/e, the probability p * (ν, τ ) happens to be the unique solution of the equation
In this case, it is beneficial to perform the trivial test with a suitable probability. The inequality τ ln τ
is thus an indication that τ is too small. In view of Lemma 10, singular verification operator Ω with τ = 0 is of special interest because the overhead νh * (ν, τ ) for a given ν is maximized when τ = 0. In this case, we can provide a pretty good approximation for p * (ν) = p * (ν, 0), namely,
which is exact when ν = 1, as illustrated in Fig. 8 . Let
Lemma 11. Suppose 0 < ν ≤ 1; then h(ν/e, ν) decreases monotonically with ν, while νh(ν/e, ν) increases monotonically with ν. In addition,
Lemma 11 is proved in Appendix G. Calculation shows that the difference between νh(p 0 , ν) and νh * (ν) is less than 2% (cf . Fig. 8) ; therefore, p 0 is indeed a good approximation of p * (ν). According to Lemma 10 and Eq. (141), h * (ν) is an upper bound for h * (ν, τ ) and
is an upper bound for h(p 0 (ν), ν, τ ). So Lemma 11 has implications for all verification operators, not necessarily singular.
C. Overhead of QSV in the adversarial scenario QSV in the adversarial scenario is much more difficult than the counterpart in the nonadversarial because the device for preparing the quantum states is not trustworthy. Therefore, more resource is required to achieve the same precision, and the overhead compared with the nonadversarial scenario is of fundamental interest. Now we are ready to clarify this problem by virtue of the results derived above. The following theorem is an implication of Lemmas 10, 11, and Eq. (132).
Suppose Ω is a verification operator for |Ψ , ν = ν(Ω), and τ = τ (Ω). If p = ν/e, then
In conjunction with Eq. (2) or Eq. (134), Theorem 7 sets a general upper bound on the overhead of QSV in the adversarial scenario. Let p = ν/e or p * (ν, τ ) ≤ p ≤ p * (ν) for example; then By virtue of Lemmas 9 and 10, it is easy to verify that all three bounds in Eq. (150) decrease monotonically with 1/ǫ, 1/δ, and 1/ν, as illustrated in Figs. 7-9. Theorem 7 has profound implications for QSV in the adversarial scenario. With the help of the trivial test, the number of tests can achieve the same scaling behaviors with ǫ −1 and δ −1 as the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario presented in Eq. (2) and Eq. (12) . The overhead is at most four times when ǫ, δ ≤ 1/4 and three times when ǫ, δ ≤ 1/10; furthermore, the overhead becomes negligible when ν, ǫ, δ approach zero. It should be emphasized that our recipe for addressing the adversarial scenario is independent of the specific construction of the verification protocol once the verification operator is fixed. Moreover, the protocol for the adversarial scenario requires the same measurement settings (except for the trivial test) as employed for the nonadversarial scenario, which is the best we can hope for. Therefore, pure states can be verified in the adversarial scenario with nearly the same efficiency as in the nonadversarial scenario with respect to both the number of tests and the number of measurement settings.
Although the performance of Ω is very sensitive to the smallest eigenvalue τ , surprisingly, the performance of Ω p * is not sensitive to τ at all. According to Lemma 10, the difference between h * (ν, τ 1 ) and h * (ν, τ 2 ) for a given ν is maximized when τ 1 = 0 (cf. Eq. (147)) and τ 2 = 1−ν (cf. Eq. (139)). Calculation shows that the difference between h * (ν) and h * (ν, 1 − ν) is less than 12%, and it is even smaller when ν is close to zero or close to 1, as illustrated in Fig. 7 . Therefore, the influence of τ on the performance of Ω p * can be neglected to a large extent. Moreover, the probability p for performing the trivial test can be chosen without even knowing the value of τ , while achieving nearly optimal performance. Actually, both the choices p = p * (ν) and p = p 0 (ν) = ν/e are nearly optimal. These observations are very helpful to constructing efficient verification protocols for the adversarial scenario because we can focus on ν without worrying about the impact of τ or even knowing the value of τ . Suppose Ω is a verification operator with the largest possible ν (under given conditions), then Ω p is guaranteed to be nearly optimal, where p can be chosen to be p * (ν, τ ), p * (ν), or p 0 (ν) = ν/e. Without this insight, it would be much more difficult to devise efficient verification protocols.
X. APPLICATIONS
Our recipe presented in Sec. IX can be applied to verifying any pure state in the adversarial scenario as long as we can construct a verification strategy for the nonadversarial scenario. Here we summarize the applications of this recipe to verifying many important quantum states, some of which have already appeared on arXiv [43, 44, 48, 49] . The main results are shown in Table I . Here all verification strategies are based on (adaptive) local projective measurements together with classical communication, which are most convenient for practical applications, although our general recipe for the adversarial scenario is independent of how the verification strategy is constructed.
A. Minimum measurement settings for verifying multipartite pure states
Before considering specific quantum states, it is instructive to clarify the limitation of local measurements in general. As a first step towards this goal, we determine the minimum number of measurement settings for each party required to verify a general multipartite pure state that is genuinely multipartite entangled (GME). Recall that a multipartite pure state is GME if it cannot be expressed as a tensor product of two pure states [3] . The following proposition sets a fundamental lower bound for the number of measurement settings required by each party; see Appendix H for a proof.
Proposition 3. To verify a multipartite pure state with adaptive local projective measurements, each party needs at least two measurement settings, unless the party is not entangled with other parties.
Here we do not assume that the test operators are projectors. In general many different test operators can be constructed from a given measurement setting using different data-processing methods. If a party is not entangled with other parties, then its reduced state is a pure state and the party needs to perform only one projective measurement with the pure state as a basis state.
As an implication of Proposition 3, each party needs at least two measurement settings when the state is GME. It turns out two measurement settings for each party are also sufficient for verifying many important quantum states, including bipartite maximally entangled states [40, 41, 43] , stabilizer states (including graph states) [42, 48] , hypergraph states [48] , and Dicke states [50] . Nevertheless, more measurement settings can often improve the efficiency with respect to the total number of tests.
B. Maximally entangled states and GHZ states
First, consider bipartite maximally entangled states in dimension d × d, which have the form
up to local unitary transformations. According to Ref. [40, 43] , the maximal spectral gap of any verification strategy Ω based on LOCC or separable measurements is
The minimum number of tests required to verify |Φ within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ in the nonadversarial scenario is given by
Here the upper bound is nearly tight when ǫ is small, so we will neglect such small difference in favor of a simpler expression in the following discussions. Moreover, the verification operator Ω is necessarily homogeneous when ν(Ω) attains the upper bound d/(d + 1). So the strategy can be employed for fidelity estimation by Eq. (8).
According to Eq. (9), the standard deviation of this estimation reads
where p = tr(Ωσ) = ν(Ω)F + β(Ω).
By adding the trivial test with a suitable probability, any homogeneous strategy Ω with ν(Ω) ≤ d/(d + 1) (that is, β(Ω) ≥ 1/(d + 1)) can be constructed using LOCC. In particular, we can construct a homogeneous strategy Ω with β(Ω) = 1/e, which is optimal for high-precision verification in the adversarial scenario according to Sec. VI. Then the number of required tests satisfies
by Theorem 3. When δ ≤ 1/e, the above bound can be strengthened by Eq. (76), which yields N < eǫ −1 ln δ −1 . This bound is nearly tight in the high-precision limit.
Equations (152)-(155) above also apply to the n-qudit GHZ state for n ≥ 3 as shown in Ref. [47] . I. Verification of prominent bipartite and multipartite quantum states using local projective measurements. The second column shows spectral gaps of efficient verification strategies for the nonadversarial scenario. The third column indicates whether homogeneous strategies with given spectral gaps can be constructed. The last two columns show the numbers of tests required to verify these states within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ in the nonadversarial scenario (NNA) and adversarial scenario (N ), respectively. Verification strategies for the adversarial scenario can be constructed using the recipe presented in Sec. IX. Here d is the local dimension, n is the number of parties, and χ(G) is the chromatic number of the hypergraph or weighted graph G. For bipartite pure states and stabilizer states, the table only shows the results in the worst case.
construct a verification operator Ω with spectral gap (1 + √ s 0 s 1 ) −1 , which attains the maximum over separable measurements [45] . For a general bipartite pure state, the spectral gap achievable so far is [44, 46] 
With this strategy, the number of tests for the nonadversarial scenario reads
Moreover, this strategy can be turned into a homogeneous strategy with the same spectral gap [44] , which is useful for fidelity estimation by Eq. (8) . The standard deviation of this estimation satisfies
where p = tr(Ωσ) = ν(Ω)F + β(Ω) and the inequality follows from the inequality ν(Ω) ≥ 2/3, given that the standard deviation decreases monotonically with ν. By adding the trivial test with a suitable probability, any homogeneous strategy Ω with ν(Ω) ≤ 2/(2 + s 2 0 + s 2 1 ) can be constructed [44] . In particular, we can construct a homogeneous strategy Ω with β(Ω) = 1/e [that is, ν(Ω) = 1 − (1/e)], which is optimal for high-precision verification in the adversarial scenario, so Eq. (155) also applies to general bipartite pure states. Despite the simplicity of bipartite pure states, we are not aware of any other protocol for verifying them in the adversarial scenario that does not rely on our result. Note that selftesting can only verify a pure state up to some local isometry [38, 39, 54] , which is different from what we consider here.
D. Stabilizer states
For stabilizer states, which are equivalent to graph states under local Clifford transformations [55, 56] , several verification protocols are known in the literature [37, 42] . The protocol introduced by PLM [42] is particularly efficient in terms of the total number of tests. Recall that each n-qubit stabilizer state |G is uniquely determined by n commuting stabilizer generators in the Pauli group, which generates the stabilizer group of order 2 n . The PLM protocol measures all 2 n − 1 nontrivial stabilizer operators of |G with equal probability. The resulting verification operator reads
which is homogeneous with
(160) To verify |G within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ, the number of tests required by this protocol is
which is almost independent of the number n of qubits especially when n is large. Since the strategy in Eq. (159) is homogeneous, it can also be used for fidelity estimation by virtue of Eq. (8) . The standard deviation of this estimation satisfies
given that ν ≥ 1/2, where p = tr(Ωσ) = νF + β.
In the adversarial scenario, the strategy in Eq. (159) is nearly optimal thanks to Theorem 3, and the number of required tests satisfies
where β = β(Ω PLM ). The second upper bound is independent of the number of qubits and the specific stabilizer state (or graph state). Moreover, the scaling behaviors in ǫ and δ are both optimal. Such a high efficiency in the adversarial scenario is achieved for the first time. Previously, the best protocol for the adversarial scenario (without using our recipe) required ⌈m 3 /(δǫ)⌉ tests when G is m-colorable [16, 48] .
E. Qudit stabilizer states
Here we introduce an efficient protocol for verifying qudit stabilizer states (including qudit graph states) with the local dimension d being a prime, which generalizes the PLM protocol [42] . Let |G be a stabilizer state of n-qudits. The stabilizer group S of |G is composed of all qudit Pauli operators that stabilize |G and is isomorphic to the group Z 
Note that jk for j ∈ Z d will lead to the same measurement and test operator. Moreover, P k ′ = P k iff k ′ = jk for some j ∈ Z d with j = 0 (this conclusion may fail if d is not a prime, that is why we assume that d is a prime). So each test corresponds to a line in Z A verification protocol for |G can be constructed by performing all distinct tests P k randomly each with prob-
(166) The number of tests required by this protocol is
which decreases monotonically with the local dimension d. Surprisingly, qudit stabilizer states with d > 2 (assuming d is a prime) can be verified more efficiently than qubit stabilizer states. Similar to the qubit case, the above protocol can be applied for fidelity estimation. The standard deviation of this estimation satisfies
By adding the trivial test with a suitable probability we can construct any homogeneous verification operator Ω for |G with
When d is an odd prime, we can construct a homogeneous verification operator Ω with β(Ω) = 1/e, which is optimal for the adversarial scenario in the high-precision limit. Then the number of required tests satisfies N ≤ eǫ −1 ln δ −1 as in Eq. (155).
F. Hypergraph states
A hypergraph graph G = (V, E) is characterized by a set V of vertices and a set E of hyperedges [6, 7] . For each hypergraph G, one can construct a hypergraph state by preparing the state |+ = (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2 for each vertex of G and then applying the generalized controlled-Z operation on the vertices of each hyperedge e ∈ E [6, 7] . As a generalization of graph states, hypergraph states are very useful to quantum computation and foundation studies.
Recently, the authors proposed an efficient protocolthe cover protocol-for verifying general hypergraph states, which requires only two Pauli measurements for each party [48] . As a special case, a coloring protocol can be constructed for each coloring of the hypergraph G. Suppose G has chromatic number χ(G); then the optimal coloring protocol requires only χ(G) distinct measurement settings and can achieve a spectral gap of
where n is the number of qubits. Accordingly, the number of required tests reads
This performance is nearly optimal if the chromatic number χ(G) is small. For example, Union Jack states [18] can be verified with a high efficiency since the chromatic number of the underlying Union Jack lattice is only 3. These states are particularly interesting because they can realize universal quantum computation under Pauli measurements [18] . By virtue of the general recipe presented in Sec. IX, we can construct a hedged coloring protocol as characterized by the verification operator Ω p with p = ν/e [48] . In the adversarial scenario, the number of tests required by Ω p satisfies
where F = 1 − ǫ. This bound is comparable to the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario especially when n is large. This protocol is dramatically more efficient than previous protocols for verifying hypergraph states as proposed in Refs. [19, 51] . For example, the protocol of Ref. [51] (which improves over Ref. [19] ) requires more than (2 ln 2)n 3 ǫ −18 tests when δ = ǫ and 4nǫ ≤ 1 (the number of tests was derived only for a restricted parameter range) [48] . The hedged coloring protocol is instrumental to realizing verifiable blind quantum computation and quantum supremacy. Its high efficiency demonstrates the power of the general recipe to constructing efficient verification protocols for the adversarial scenario proposed in this work.
Incidentally, the above results also apply to qudit hypergraph states, including qudit graph states in particular [48] . In the case of graph states, the hedged coloring protocol is less efficient than the PLM protocol [42] adapted for the adversarial scenario as discussed in Sec. X D, but requires much fewer measurement settings.
G. Weighted graph states
Next, consider weighted graph states [57] . Recently, Hayashi and Takeuchi introduced several efficient protocols for verifying the weighted graph state |G associated with any weighted graph G [49] . One of their protocols is based on a coloring of G and adaptive local projective measurements. It can achieve the same spectral gap as in Eq. (169), that is, ν(Ω) = χ(G) −1 ≥ n −1 , where χ(G) now refers to the chromatic number of the weighted graph G. As in the case of hypergraph states, we can construct a hedged coloring protocol characterized by the verification operator Ω p with p = ν/e [48] . Then the number of tests required by Ω p to verify |G in the adversarial scenario satisfies
as in Eq. (171). So weighted graph states can be verified with the same efficiency as hypergraph states. It should be pointed out that the original protocol in Ref. [49] is based on an earlier version of this paper for dealing with the adversarial scenario [48] , so the scaling behavior of N with the significance level is suboptimal. The latest results developed here as presented in Sec. IX are required to achieve the optimal scaling behavior shown in Eq. (172). We are not aware of any other protocol for verifying weighted graph states in the adversarial scenario.
H. Dicke states
Dicke states are another important class of multipartite quantum states which are useful for quantum metrology. The n-qubit Dicke state with k excitations can be expressed as follows,
where B n,k denotes the set of strings in {0, 1} n with Hamming weight k. To avoid trivial cases, here we assume that n ≥ 3 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. The Dicke state reduces to a W state when k = 1. Recently, Liu et al. [50] proposed an efficient protocol for verifying the Dicke state, which can achieve a spectral gap of
To verify the Dicke state within infidelity ǫ and significance level δ, the number of required tests reads
In the adversarial scenario, we can construct a hedged verification strategy Ω p with p = ν/e by Sec. IX. Thanks to Theorem 7, the number of tests required by Ω p satisfies
This number is comparable to the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario. To the best of our knowledge, no protocol is known previously for verifying general Dicke states in the adversarial scenario. To summarize the above discussions, by virtue of our recipe presented in Sec. IX, optimal protocols for the adversarial scenario can be constructed for all bipartite pure states, GHZ states, and qudit stabilizer states whose local dimension is an odd prime. Nearly optimal protocols can be constructed for qubit stabilizer states and those hypergraph states with small chromatic numbers, including Union Jack states. For general hypergraph states, weighted graph states, and Dicke states, the number of required tests is only about nǫ −1 ln δ −1 as shown in Table I, which is dramatically smaller than what is required by previous verification protocols (whenever such protocols are available).
XI. COMPARISON WITH OTHER APPROACHES
Before concluding this paper, it is instructive to compare QSV with other approaches for estimating or verifying quantum states, such as (traditional) quantum state tomography [35] , compressed sensing [36] , direct fidelity estimation (DFE) [37] , self-testing [38, 39] . In this way we hope to put QSV in a wide context, but we do not intend to be exhaustive. Here we are mainly interested in the efficiencies of these approaches with respect to the total number of tests, measurements, or copies of the state required to reach a given precision. Before such a comparison, it should be pointed out that different approaches rely on different assumptions and address different problems. So it is impossible to make a completely fair comparison.
In quantum state tomography, compressed sensing, and DFE, we usually assume that the states prepared in different runs are independent and identical and that the measurement devices are trustworthy. In addition, many protocols only require local projective measurements or even Pauli measurements, which are usually much easier to implement than other more complicated operations. In QSV, the measurement devices are still trustworthy, but the states for different runs may be different as long as they are independent [42] . In the adversarial scenario, arbitrary correlated or entangled state preparation is allowed. In self-testing, even the measurement devices are not trusted [38, 39] . The different strengths of assumption underlying these approaches are illustrated in Fig. 10 .
In addition, different approaches address different questions. Quantum state tomography aims to address the following question: What is the state? To answer this question amounts to reconstruct the density matrix, so the number of parameters to be determined increases exponentially with the number of qubits (here we assume that each subsystem is a qubit for simplicity; the general situation is similar). That is why the resource overhead of tomography increases exponentially with the number of qubits. Compressed sensing addresses a similar question, and so cannot avoid the exponential scaling of resource costs. Nevertheless, it can reduce the resource overhead significantly by exploiting the structure of quantum states with low ranks [36] . DFE, QSV, and self-testing address a different type of questions: Is the state identical to the target state, or how close is it? Here the target state is usually a pure state, and the closeness is usually quantified by fidelity or infidelity. Quite often answering these questions is sufficient for many applications in quantum information processing, so it is of fundamental interest to extract such key information efficiently without full tomography. DFE aims to determine the fidelity (infidelity) between the state prepared and the target state [37] . QSV tries to decide whether the fidelity (infidelity) is larger (smaller) than a given threshold, which is usually easier than fidelity estimation [40] [41] [42] . Self-testing can only provide a lower bound for the fidelity up to some local isometry because the measurement devices are not trustworthy, and the conclusion is solely based on the observed probabilities [38, 39] .
Suppose we can optimize measurement settings and data-processing procedures, then the efficiency of an approach is mainly determined by the strength of the underlying assumption and the amount of information it extracts. However, in general it is very difficult to determine the efficiency limit of a given approach because it is very difficult to perform such optimization. In addition, it is highly nontrivial to determine the impacts of various assumptions.
Although DFE is much more efficient than quantum state tomography, the resource cost still increases exponentially with the number of qubits, except for some special families of states, such as stabilizer states. The DFE protocol originally proposed in Ref. [37] only requires Pauli measurements; it is not clear if we can avoid the exponential scaling behavior if more general local measurements are taken into account. In the case of selftesting, there are already numerous research works (see the review paper Ref. [39] ); however, little is known about the resource cost to reach a given precision, especially in the multipartite setting. A few known protocols for selftesting multipartite states are highly resource consuming and hardly practical for systems of more than ten qubits. For example, the resource required to self-test Dicke states increases exponentially with the number of qubits [58, 59] . It is still not clear whether this inefficiency is fundamentally inevitable or is due to our lack of imagination.
In QSV in the nonadversarial scenario, we have shown in Sec. III B that the variation in states prepared in different runs does not induce any resource overhead as long as these states are independent of each other. In other words, as far as the efficiency is concerned, we can assume that these states are identical and independent as assumed in quantum state tomography, compressed sensing, and DFE. Moreover, thanks to our recipe presented in Sec. IX, pure states can be verified in the adversarial scenario with nearly the same efficiency as in the nonadversarial scenario. In many cases, we can even construct optimal protocols, which are quite rare for other approaches. Therefore, we can expect that QSV even in the adversarial scenario is more efficient than DFE and selftesting, as illustrated in Fig. 10 . This is indeed the case for all states for which verification protocols have been found, including bipartite pure states, GHZ states, stabilizer states (including graph states), hypergraph states, weighted graph states, and Dicke states. For example, Dicke states, hypergraph states, and weighted graph states can be verified efficiently in the adversarial scenario, although no efficient DFE or self-testing protocols are available. In the case of general hypergraph states and weighted graph states, actually, no self-testing protocols are known at all.
As pointed out earlier, it would be unfair to compare QSV with self-testing directly, but so far the former is the only practical choice for intermediate and large quantum systems especially in the adversarial scenario. Although self-testing has been studied more intensively in the literature [39] , it is still very difficult to construct efficient self-testing protocols for multipartite states because the measurement devices are not trustworthy. Insight from QSV may be helpful to studying self-testing, and vice versa. The relations between QSV and self-testing are worth further exploration in the future. In particular, it would be desirable to combine the merits of the two approaches. We hope that our work can stimulate further progresses along this direction.
XII. SUMMARY
We presented a comprehensive study of pure-state verification in the adversarial scenario. Notably, we introduced a general method for computing the main figures of merit pertinent to QSV in the adversarial scenario, such as the fidelity and the number of required tests. In addition, we introduced homogeneous strategies and derived analytical formulas for the main figures of merit of practical interest. The conditions for single-copy verification are also clarified, which are instructive to understanding single-copy entanglement detection. Moreover, we proposed a simple but powerful recipe to constructing efficient verification protocols for the adversarial scenario from the counterpart for the nonadversarial scenario. Thanks to this recipe, any pure state can be verified in the adversarial scenario with nearly the same efficiency as in the nonadversarial scenario. Therefore, to verify a pure quantum state efficiently in the adversarial scenario, it remains to find an efficient protocol for the nonadversarial scenario, which is usually much easier.
Our recipe can readily be applied to the verification of many important quantum states in quantum information processing, including bipartite pure states, GHZ states, stabilizer states, hypergraph states, weighted graph states, and Dicke states. Recently, efficient protocols have been constructed for verifying these states in the nonadversarial scenario. By virtue of our recipe, all these states can be verified in the adversarial scenario with surprising high efficiencies. These results are instrumental to many quantum information processing tasks that demand high security requirements, such as blind MBQC and quantum networks. The potential of our study is to be unleashed further in the future.
arranged in decreasing order 1 = λ 1 > λ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ D , and Π j are mutually orthogonal rank-1 projectors with Π 1 = |Ψ Ψ|. Without loss of generality, we may assume that σ is diagonal in the eigenbasis of Ω because both tr(Ωσ) and Ψ|σ|Ψ only depend on the diagonal elements of σ in this basis. Suppose σ = D j=1 x j Π j with x j ≥ 0 and j x j = 1. Then
Therefore,
where ν(Ω) := 1 − β = 1 − λ 2 . The maximum can be attained when σ = (1 − ǫ)(|Ψ Ψ|) + ǫΠ 2 .
Appendix B: Proofs of Lemmas 1 to 6
In this Appendix we prove Lemmas 1 to 6 presented in Sec. V.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ρ be an arbitrary permutationinvariant diagonal density matrix on H ⊗(N +1) with decomposition ρ = k∈SN c k ρ k , where c k form a probability distribution on S N . Recall that S N is the set of all
To compute η(N, 0, Ω), we need to determine those k ∈ S N at which ζ k (λ) = 0. According to Eq. (27) , this condition is satisfied iff k 1 = 0, or λ i = 0 and k i ≥ 1 for some 2 ≤ i ≤ D. In the first case, η k (λ) ≤ β N , and the inequality is saturated when k = (0, N + 1, 0, . . . , 0) . In the second case,
and the inequality is saturated when k = (N, 0, . . . , 0, 1). If τ > 0, then only the first case can occur, so we have η(N, 0, Ω) = β N . If τ = 0, then both cases can occur, so η(N, 0, Ω) = max{β N , 1/(N + 1)}. In conclusion, we have η(N, 0, Ω) = δ c , which confirms Lemma 1.
Next, consider the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3. From the definitions in Eqs. (20) and (34) we can deduce the following equalities.
Therefore, Lemmas 2 and 3 are immediate consequences of Lemma 12 below.
Lemma 12. The following statements hold.
1.ζ(N, δ, Ω) is convex in δ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and is strictly increasing in δ for δ c ≤ δ ≤ 1.
2.η(N, f, Ω) is concave and strictly increasing in f for 0 ≤ f ≤ 1.
Lemma 12 implies that the two functionsζ(N, δ, Ω) andF (N, δ, Ω) are nondecreasing in δ for 0 < δ ≤ 1, given that the two functions are nonnegative and that
for δ = (1 − s)δ 1 + sδ 2 and 0 ≤ s, δ 1 , δ 2 ≤ 1. Note that this inequality is trivial when δ 1 = δ 2 or s = 0, 1. The concavity ofη(N, f, Ω) means
Proof of Lemma 12. The convexity ofζ(N, δ, Ω) in δ can be proved by virtue of the definition in Eq. (34) . Suppose 0 ≤ δ 1 < δ 2 ≤ 1 and 0 < s < 1; let δ = (1 − s)δ 1 + sδ 2 . If δ 1 > δ c , then there exist two quantum states ρ 1 and ρ 2 that satisfy
Let ρ = (1 − s)ρ 1 + sρ 2 ; then
so that 
which confirms Eq. (B4) again. Therefore,ζ(N, δ, Ω) is convex in δ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
To prove the monotonicity ofζ(N, δ, Ω) with δ, let δ 1 , δ 2 be real numbers that satisfy δ c ≤ δ 1 < δ 2 ≤ 1. Then there exists a quantum state ρ 2 such that p ρ2 = δ 2 and f ρ2 =ζ(N, δ 2 , Ω) > 0. Let s be the solution to the equation
It follows thatζ(N, δ, Ω) is strictly increasing in δ when δ c ≤ δ ≤ 1. As a corollary,ζ(N, δ, Ω) is nondecreasing in
Next, consider statement 2 in Lemma 12. The concavity ofη(N, f, Ω) follows from a similar reasoning that leads to Eq. (B8).
To prove the monotonicity ofη(N, f, Ω) over f , choose 0 ≤ f 1 < f 2 ≤ 1. Then there exists a quantum state ρ 1 such that
Here the second inequality follows from the facts that 0 < s ≤ 1 and thatη(N, f 1 , Ω) < 1. Next, consider statement 3 in Lemma 12. Suppose δ 1 , δ 2 are real numbers that satisfy δ c ≤ δ 1 < δ 2 ≤ 1. ThenF (N, δ 2 , Ω) > 0 and there exists a quantum state ρ 2 such that p ρ2 = δ 2 and f ρ2 = δ 2F (N, δ 2 , Ω) . By assumption, δ 1 can be expressed as a convex sum of δ 2 and δ c , that is,
(B13) Therefore,F (N, δ, Ω) is strictly increasing in δ whenever δ c ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Finally, consider statement 4 in Lemma 12. Suppose f 1 and f 2 are real numbers that satisfy 0 < f 1 < f 2 ≤ 1 and let s = f 1 /f 2 . Then 0 < s < 1 and there exists a quantum state ρ 2 such that f ρ2 = f 2 and p ρ2 = f 2 /F (N, f 2 , Ω). Let ρ 1 = sρ 2 + (1 − s)ρ c , where ρ c is a quantum state that satisfies p ρc = δ c and f ρc = 0. Then we have
so that
(B15) Therefore,F (N, f, Ω) increases strictly monotonically with f when 0 < f ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. To prove Eq. (39) such that p ρ = δ and f ρ = f 1 , which implies that
Since ζ(N, δ, Ω) is strictly increasing in δ for δ c ≤ δ ≤ 1 according to Lemma 3,  we conclude that δ 1 ≤ δ. This observation implies that δ 1 = δ and confirms Eq. (39) given the opposite inequality derived above.
Next, consider Eq. (40) . Let δ 1 = η(N, f, Ω) and f 1 = ζ(N, δ 1 , Ω). Then there exists a quantum state ρ on H ⊗(N +1) such that p ρ = δ 1 and f ρ = f , which implies that f 1 = ζ(N, δ 1 , Ω) ≤ f . Meanwhile, there exists a state ρ ′ such that f ρ ′ = f 1 and p ρ ′ = δ 1 , which implies that η(N, f 1 , Ω) ≥ δ 1 = η(N, f, Ω). Since η(N, δ, Ω) is strictly increasing in f for 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 according to Lemma 3, we conclude that f 1 ≥ f . This observation implies that f 1 = f and confirms Eq. (40) given the opposite inequality derived above.
Proof of Lemma 5. Recall that ζ(N, δ, Ω) is convex and nondecreasing in δ according to Lemma 3. In addition, ζ(N, δ, Ω) is a piecewise-linear function of δ, and each turning point is equal to η k for some k ∈ S N at which ζ(N, δ = η k , Ω) = ζ k (cf. Lemma 13 below). Here η k and ζ k are shorthands for η k (λ) and ζ k (λ), respectively, which are defined in Eq. (27) . To prove Eq. (41a), it suffices to prove the inequality ζ k ≥ ζ(N − 1, η k , Ω) for each turning point.
If k 1 = 0, then ζ k = 0, which implies that η k ≤ δ c according to Lemma 1, so that 
where η k ′ ,N −1 and ζ k ′ ,N −1 are given in Eq. (27) with N replaced by N − 1 and k replaced by k ′ . In conjunction with Lemma 3 we conclude that
which implies Eq. (41a) as desired. If δ ≤ δ c then we
So the inequality in Eq. (41a) is saturated in both cases. If the upper bound in Eq. (B17) is saturated, then ζ k ′ ,N −1 = ζ k , which implies that ζ k = 0 (which means η k ≤ δ c ) or ζ k = 1 (which means η k = 1). So the upper bound in Eq. (B17) cannot be saturated whenever the turning point satisfies δ c < η k < 1. In conjunction with Eqs. (32) and (33) , this observation implies that the inequality in Eq. (41a) is saturated iff δ ≤ δ c or δ = 1. According to Lemma 2, Eq. (41b) and Eq. (41a) are equivalent, so the same conclusion also applies to Eq. (41b). Equation (41c) and the equality condition can be derived using a similar reasoning as presented above. Equations (41d) and (41c) are equivalent according to Lemma 2. Alternatively, Eq. (41c) can be derived from Lemmas 1, 3, 4, and Eq. (41a). To be specific, if f = 0, then η(N, f, Ω) < η(N − 1, f, Ω) according to Lemma 1, so Eq. (41c) holds with strict inequality. If f > 0, then
according to Lemmas 1 and 3, where δ c is given in Eq. (31) . In addition, Eq. (41a) and Lemma 4 implies that
In conjunction with Lemma 3, this equation implies that
and confirms Eq. (41c). If the inequality in Eq. (41c) is saturated, then the inequality in Eq. (B20) is saturated, so that η(N − 1, f, Ω) ≤ δ c or η(N − 1, f, Ω) = 1. The first case cannot happen, while the second case holds iff f = 1. Therefore, the inequality in Eq. (41c) is saturated iff f = 1.
Proof of Lemma 6. Lemma 6 follows from the definition of N (ǫ, δ, Ω) in Eq. (23) and the fact that the following four inequalities are equivalent,
Here the equivalence of the first two inequalities is a corollary of Lemma 2; so is the equivalence of the last two inequalities. The equivalence of the middle two inequalities follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, note that δ ≥ δ c if either inequality is satisfied.
By Eq. (38) in the main text, ζ(N, δ, Ω) and η(N, f, Ω) are piecewise linear functions, whose turning points correspond to the extremal points of the region R N,Ω , which have the form (η k (λ), ζ k (λ)) for certain k ∈ S N . In conjunction with the monotonicity and convexity (concavity) of ζ(N, δ, Ω) (η(N, f, Ω)) stated in Lemma 3 (see also Lemma 4), we can deduce the following conclusion. Here δ c is defined in Eq. (31).
Lemma 13. ζ(N, δ, Ω) for δ c ≤ δ ≤ 1 and η(N, f, Ω) for 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 can be expressed as follows,
where j and l are chosen so that a j ≤ δ ≤ a j+1 and
. , m, which satisfy the following conditions
If Ω is a nonsingular homogeneous strategy defined in Eq. (45) Lemma 14. Suppose 0 < λ < 1 and j, k ∈ Z ≥0 with k < j. Then g k (λ) decreases strictly monotonically with k, and g kj (λ) decreases strictly monotonically with j, k.
Lemma 15. Let 0 ≤ λ < 1 and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N + 1}. Then
The first inequality is saturated iff k = N + 1, or k ≥ 2 and λ = 0; the second inequality is saturated iff k = 1.
Lemma 15 in particular implies that
recall that N is a positive integer.
Lemma 16. Suppose 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1. Then
where k * is the largest integer k that satisfies η k ≥ δ, k + = ⌈log λ δ⌉, and k − = ⌊log λ δ⌋. In addition
Lemma 17. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ, λ < 1 and k ∈ Z ≥0 . Theñ N (ǫ, δ, λ, k) > 0 and it decreases strictly monotonically with ǫ and δ.
Lemma 18. Suppose 0 < ǫ, δ, λ < 1. Theñ
where F = 1 − ǫ, ν = 1 − λ, and k − = ⌊log λ δ⌋. The inequality is saturated when log λ δ is an integer.
Proof of Lemma 14. According to Eqs. (C1) and (C2) as well as the definitions of η k (λ) and ζ k (λ) in Eq. (48), we have
where ν = 1 − λ. So g k (λ) decreases strictly monotonically with k for k ∈ Z ≥0 . Simple analysis shows that g kj (λ) can be expressed as a weighted average of g m (λ) for m = k, k + 1, . . . , j − 1, namely,
where the weight for each g m (λ) is strictly positive. So
is a convex sum of g kj (λ) and g j (λ), that is,
which implies that g k(j+1) (λ) < g kj (λ); by the same token we can prove g (k+1)j (λ) < g kj (λ) when k + 1 < j. Therefore, g kj (λ) decreases strictly monotonically with k and j.
Proof of Lemma 15. When 0 < λ < 1, Lemma 15 is an immediate consequence of Lemma 14 given that
So ζ(N, δ, λ, k) ≥ ζ(N, δ, λ, k − 1) iff δ ≤ η k and the inequality is saturated only when δ = η k . Therefore, the maximum of ζ(N, δ, λ, k) over k ∈ Z ≥0 is attained when k is the largest integer that satisfies η k ≥ δ, which confirms Eq. (C5).
Before proving Eq. (C6), we first prove Eqs. (C7) and (C8). According to Eq. (54) in the main text and the definition of k * , ζ(N, δ, λ, k * ) is a convex sum of ζ k * (λ) and ζ k * +1 (λ) in which the weight of ζ k * (λ) is nonzero. If 0 < δ ≤ λ N , then we have k * ≥ N + 1, which implies that ζ k * (λ) ≤ 0 and ζ k * +1 (λ) < 0. Therefore, ζ(N, δ, λ, k * ) ≤ 0, which confirms Eq. (C7). Conversely, if λ N < δ ≤ 1, then k * ≤ N , which implies that ζ k * (λ) > 0 and ζ k * +1 (λ) ≥ 0. So ζ(N, δ, λ, k * ) > 0, which confirms Eq. (C8).
Alternatively, to prove Eq. (C7), we can prove that ζ(N, δ, λ, k) ≤ 0 for k ∈ Z ≥0 . Given that ζ(N, δ, λ, k) is a linear function of δ, it suffices to prove the result when δ = 0 and δ = λ N . According to Eq. (54),
To prove the inequality ζ(N, δ = λ N , λ, k) ≤ 0, it suffices to prove the following inequality
This inequality can be verified by noting that the lefthand side is equal to 0 when λ = 1 and that its derivative over λ is nonnegative,
Therefore, ζ(N, δ = λ N , λ, k) ≤ 0, which implies Eq. (C7) given Eq. (C18). Now we can prove Eq. (C6). If 0 < δ ≤ λ N , then the equality holds because both sides are equal to zero according to Eq. (C7). On the other hand, if
which confirms Eq. (C6).
Proof of Lemma 17. To prove Lemma 17, we first investigate the monotonicity ofÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) defined in Eq. (63) for 0 < ǫ, δ ≤ 1, 0 < λ < 1, and k ∈ Z ≥0 . The partial derivative ofÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) over ǫ reads
where the inequality is saturated iff k = 0 and δ = 1. This conclusion is easy to verify when k = 0, given that λ k+1 + δ(kν − λ) = (1 − δ)λ ≥ 0. When k ≥ 1, the conclusion follows from the inequality λ k+1 + δ(kν − λ) > 0, which can be verified by analyzing the two extreme cases δ = 0 and δ = 1; note that this inequality is well defined even if δ = 0 althoughÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) is not. Therefore, N (ǫ, δ, λ, k) is strictly decreasing in ǫ for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 except when k = 0 and δ = 1, in which caseÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) = 0.
Next, the partial derivative ofÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) over δ reads
SoÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) is strictly decreasing in δ for 0 < δ ≤ 1. According to the above analysis,
Here the first inequality is saturated iff ǫ = δ = 1, or δ = 1 and k = 0; the second inequality is saturated iff k = 0, 1. Therefore,Ñ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) > 0, except when δ = 1 and k = 0, or ǫ = δ = k = 1. In particular, we havẽ N (ǫ, δ, λ, k) > 0 when 0 < ǫ, δ < 1. Now suppose 0 < ǫ, δ < 1 and δ ≤ λ k /(F + λǫ). If in addition k = 0, thenÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) > k according to the above analysis. If k ≥ 1 and δ = λ k /(F + λǫ), theñ
SinceÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) is monotonically deceasing in δ, we haveÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, k) > k − 1 whenever δ ≤ λ k /(F + λǫ).
Proof of Lemma 18. The equality in Eq. (C9) can be verified by straightforward calculation given the equality F ν + λ = 1 − νǫ. According to Theorem 2,
To prove the inequality in Eq. (C9), it is equivalent to prove the following inequality
where a = log λ δ − ⌊log λ δ⌋, which satisfies 0 ≤ a < 1. Equation (C28) holds because the function λ 1−a − λ − νa is convex in a and is equal to 0 when a = 0 and a = 1. This observation completes the proof of Eq. (C9).
When log λ δ is an integer, we have a = 0, so the inequality in Eq. (C28) and that in (C9) are saturated.
Proofs of Theorems 1-3 and Eq. (73)
Proof of Theorem 1. According to Lemma 2, we have
where ζ j , ζ k are shorthands for ζ j (λ), ζ k (λ), and the parameters k, j are restricted by the requirements η k ≥ δ and η j < δ. The coefficients c j , c k are determined by the conditions
which yield
where g kj = g kj (λ) is defined in Eq. (C1). If j > k + 1, then η j−1 < δ or η k+1 ≥ δ, so the value of c j ζ j + c k ζ k does not increase if we replace j with j − 1 or k with k + 1 according to Lemma 14. Therefore, the minimum in Eq. (C29) can be attained when j = k + 1 and η k+1 < δ ≤ η k , in which case k = k * is the largest integer that satisfies the condition η k ≥ δ. In addition we have c k = c k (δ, λ) and c j = 1 − c k (δ, λ), so that
which confirms Eq. (55).
Proof of Theorem 2. By definition N (ǫ, δ, λ) is the minimum value of positive integer N under the condition
where F δ > 0. According to Corollary 1 in the main text, Eq. (C34) is equivalent to
From the definition of ζ(N, δ, λ, k) in Eq. (54) we can deduce that the inequality ζ(N, δ, λ, k) ≥ F δ is satisfied iff
which confirms the first equality in Eq. (64). Calculation shows that
Note that
whenever one side of the equation is known to be positive by Corollary 1 in the main text. Based on this observation, we can derive 
To prove the lower bound in Eq. (73), we first compute the derivative ofÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, 1) over λ, with the result
The minimum ofÑ (ǫ, δ, λ, 1) over the interval 0 < λ < 1 is attained when λ/(1 − λ) = δF/(1 − δ), that is,
which confirms the lower bound in Eq. (73).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let N = k + + k+F λǫ . According to Corollary 3, we have
which implies that N (ǫ, δ, λ) ≤ N and confirms the upper bound in Eq. (74).
By virtue of Corollary 3 we can deduce that
which implies that N (ǫ, δ, λ) ≥ N and confirms the lower bound in Eq. (74). If log λ δ is an integer, then k + = k − , so the lower bound and the upper bound in Eq. (74) coincide, which means both of them are saturated. Alternatively, this fact can be verified by virtue of Theorem 2.
Finally, let us prove Eq. (75). According to Theorem 2 in the main text and Lemma 18,
which confirms Eq. (75). If log λ δ is an integer, then both inequalities are saturated, so the bound in Eq. (75) is saturated.
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. If the strategy Ω is homogeneous, then we have ζ(N, δ, Ω) = ζ(N, δ, β), and Theorem 4 follows from Proposition 2. In general Theorem 4 can be proved based on Eq. (38) and the observation that η k (λ)−ζ k (λ) = 1/2 for all k ∈ S * 1 whenever ζ k (λ) = 0 given the assumption N = 1. Geometrically, this fact means that all points (η k (λ), ζ k (λ)) for k ∈ S * 1 lie on two line segments. To be specific, recall that ζ(N, δ, Ω) ≤ ζ(N, δ, β). When β ≥ 1/2, Eq. (106) holds because the opposite inequality ζ(N, δ, Ω) ≥ ζ(N, δ, β) also holds. In view of Eq. (38) , to verify this claim, it suffices to prove that
The assumption k ∈ S 1 means k j ≥ 0 and j k j = 2. 
So Eq. (D1) holds, which implies ζ(N, δ, Ω) ≥ ζ(N, δ, β).
In conjunction with the opposite inequality, we conclude that ζ(N, δ, Ω) = ζ(N, δ, β), which confirms Eq. (106). Next, consider the case β < 1/2. If τ = β, then Eq. (107) follows from Eq. (95). If τ < β, letΩ be a verification operator with three distinct eigenvalues, 1, β, τ (the eigenvalue 1 is nondegenerate); then we have ζ(N, δ, Ω) ≤ ζ(N, δ,Ω). In addition, it is straightforward to verify Eq. (107) if Ω is replaced byΩ. To prove Eq. (107), it suffices to prove that ζ(N, δ, Ω) ≥ ζ(N, δ,Ω). In view of Eq. (38) , it suffices to verify that such that p ρ = δ and
Since p ρ and f ρ are linear in ρ, it suffices to find such a state in the two cases δ = 1/(N +1) and δ = δ * , respectively. When δ = 1/(N + 1), we can choose the state ρ = ρ k with k = (N, 0, . . . , 0, 1), in which case we have p ρ = 1/(N + 1) and f ρ = 0, so Eq. (E1) holds as desired, note that Ω is singular by assumption, which means τ = λ D = 0.
In the case δ = δ * , we can choose ρ = ρ k1 , where k 1 := (N, 1, 0, . . . , 0). According to Eq. (27), we have
and Eq. (E1) holds again. This observation completes the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Theorem 5. To prove the inequality in Eq. (114) in the theorem, let ρ = k∈SN c k ρ k . If p ρ = 1, then we have c k = δ k,k0 , where k 0 := (N +1, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore, F ρ = f ρ = 1 and F (N, δ = 1, Ω) = 1, so Eq. (114) holds. If 0 < p ρ < 1, then c k0 < 1 and
where S * N := S N \ {k 0 } is the subset of S N without the vector k 0 := (N +1, 0, . . . , 0) , and c ′ k := c k /(1−c k0 ) form a probability distribution on S * N . By virtue of Lemma 20 below, we can deduce that
where k 1 = (N, 1, 0, . . . , 0) . Therefore,
By the definition in Eq. (20c), we conclude that
Incidentally, the above bound is negative and thus trivial when δ ≤ β N since β N < 1/(N ν + 1) according to Eq. (C4). Now we show that the inequality in Eq. (114) [that is, Eq. (E8)] is saturated when δ ≥ δ * = η k1 (λ). To this end, it suffices to show that the inequality in Eq. (E6) can be saturated when
, we have p ρ = 1 and f ρ = 1, so Eq. (E6) is saturated. When c k = δ k,k1 , that is, ρ = ρ k1 , we have p ρ = η k1 (λ) and f ρ = ζ k1 (λ), so Eq. (E6) is also saturated. Since both p ρ and f ρ are linear in ρ, it follows that the inequality in Eq. (E6) can be saturated by a convex combination of ρ k0 and ρ k1 whenever p ρ ≥ η k1 (λ).
Next, we prove Eq. (115) when ν ≥ 1/2. To this end, note that
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 19 below. Therefore,
which implies that
and confirms Eq. (115). If in addition Ω is singular and δ satisfies 1/(N + 1) ≤ δ ≤ δ * , then this bound is saturated according to Lemma 7. 
Here the second inequality follows from the assumption ν(Ω) ≥ 1/2, which means λ 2 ≤ 1/2.
Lemma 20. For any k ∈ S * N , we have
where ν = 1 − β with β = λ 2 and τ = λ D , assuming that λ 1 = 1 and λ j are arranged in decreasing order.
The lower bound in Eq. (E14) can be expressed as
where k 1 := (N, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
Proof. Note that j k j = N + 1 and k 1 ≤ N by the assumption k ∈ S * N . According to Lemma 21 below, ξ k (λ) ≥ ξ k (1, β, . . . , β) = ξ (k1,N −k1+1) (1, β)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 15 in Appendix C. Note that the definition of ξ k (λ) (as well as that of η k (λ) and ζ k (λ)) can be extended as long as k and λ have the same number of components. By the same token, we have ξ k (λ) ≤ ξ k (1, τ, . . . , τ ) = ξ (k1,N −k1+1) (1, τ )
where the two inequalities follow from Lemma 21 and Lemma 15, respectively.
Here it is instructive to take a look at the special scenario in which ζ k (λ) = 0 (cf. the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix B), which means k 1 = 0, or λ i = 0 and k i ≥ 1 for some 2 ≤ i ≤ D. In the first case, we have τ N ≤ η k (λ) ≤ β N , so that
In the second case, we have τ = 0 and
These results are compatible with Lemma 20 as expected. For j ≥ 2, calculation shows that
where θ := i u ki i /(N + 1). These derivatives have well-defined limits even when some components u i go to zero; this fact would be clearer if we insert the expression of θ and adopt lengthier expressions for these derivatives. In addition, note that 1 − θk 1 ≥ 1/(N + 1) > 0. The inequality in Eq. (E24) is strict except when k j = 0, in which case ξ k (u) is independent of u j , so are η k (u) and ζ k (u). Therefore, ξ k (u) is nonincreasing in u j for j ≥ 2; in other words, ξ k (u) ≥ ξ k (v) whenever 0 < u ≤ v ≤ 1 and u 1 = v 1 = 1. The condition 0 < u ≤ v ≤ 1 can be relaxed to 0 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1 by continuity.
Appendix F: Proofs of Lemma 8 and Theorem 6
Before proving Lemma 8 and Theorem 6, wee need to introduce a few auxiliary notations and results.
When Ω is positive definite, that is, τ (Ω) > 0, we can extend the definition of η k (λ) and ζ k (λ) over k to the convex hull of S N , denoted byS N , which is composed of vectors k = (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k D ) that satisfy 
If δ = η 1 , then Eq. (F3) holds because S N ∈S N . So it remains to consider the scenario η 0 < δ < η 1 , in which case we have 0 < c 0 , c 1 < 1. Let F j = ζ j /η j for j = 0, 1, then F 0 < F 1 by Lemma 13. Geometrically, the point (δ, ζ(N, δ, Ω)) lies on the line segment that connects the two end points (η 0 , ζ 0 ) and (η 1 , ζ 1 ), which has slope (ζ 1 − ζ 0 )/(η 1 − η 0 ). For 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let k(t) = q 0 (1 − t) + q 1 t = q 0 + (q 1 − q 0 )t, (F6) η(t) = η k(t) (λ), ζ(t) = ζ k(t) (λ),
Note that k(t) ∈S N for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1; in addition, η(0) = η 0 , ζ(0) = ζ 0 , F (0) = F 0 , while η(1) = η 1 , ζ(1) = ζ 1 , F (1) = F 1 . So Eq. (F7) defines a parametric curve (η(t), ζ(t)) that connects (η 0 , ζ 0 ) and (η 1 , ζ 1 ). Let t δ be the smallest value of t such that η(t) = δ; then ζ(N, δ, Ω) ≤ ζ(t δ ). So Eq. (F3) would follow if we can prove ζ(t δ ) ≤ ζ(N, δ, Ω).
To achieve our goal, we shall prove that the parametric curve (η(t), ζ(t)) for 0 ≤ t ≤ t δ lies below the line segment passing through the two points (η 0 , ζ 0 ) and (η 1 , ζ 1 ).
To this end, we need to analyze the convexity (or concavity) property of the curve, which depends on the second derivative
Here the derivatives with respect to t can be computed explicitly by virtue of Eq. (27) , with the result
The condition ζ k (λ) = f entails the following inequality,
which implies that N + 1 − k 1 ≤ ln f / ln β = log β f , that is, k 1 ≥ N + 1 − (ln f / ln β). In addition, the above equation implies that 0 ≥ D j=2 k j ln λ j ≥ ln f , which in turn implies that .
The condition η k (λ) = δ entails the following inequality,
Now, Eq. (122) can be proved using a similar reasoning that leads to Eq. (F27), but with f replaced by τ δ.
Proof of Theorem 6. Equation (126) 
In conjunction with Lemma 6 this equation implies that N (ǫ, δ, Ω) ≤ N , which confirms the first upper bound in Eq. (127). By definition, |β lnβ| ≤ |β ln β| < | ln β|, which implies that h > |1/ ln β|. Therefore,
which confirms the second upper bound in Eq. (127). Equation (128) can be proved using a similar reasoning used for proving the upper bounds in Eq. (127), but with f replaced by τ δ and F (N, f, Ω) replaced by F (N, δ, Ω). 
It is clear that the denominator is positive. The numerator is also positive according to the following equation.
eβ p0 − (e − ν 2 ) ln β p0 = e − eν + ν 2 − (e − ν 2 ) ln(e − eν + ν 2 )
≥ e − eν + ν 2 − (e − ν 2 )(1 − ν)
Here the first inequality follows from the inequality below
which can be proved by inspecting the derivative. Therefore, both ν(β p0 ln τ 
given that 0 < ν ≤ 1.
Proof. First consider the bipartite case, let |Ψ be any bipartite entangled state shared between Alice and Bob. Suppose on the contrary that |Ψ can be verified by a strategy Ω for which Alice performs only one projective measurement. Without loss of generality, we may assume that this is a complete projective measurement associated with an orthonormal basis, say {|ϕ 1 , |ϕ 2 , . . . , |ϕ d }, where d is the dimension of the Hilbert space of Alice. Let P k = |ϕ k ϕ k | be the corresponding rank-1 projectors. Then any test operator necessarily has the form E = d k=1 P k ⊗ Q k , where Q k is a positive operator on the Hilbert space of Bob that satisfies 0 ≤ Q k ≤ 1. To ensure that the target state can always pass the test, E must satisfy the condition Ψ|E|Ψ = 1.
Let |ψ k = ϕ k |Ψ be the unnormalized reduced state of Bob when Alice obtains outcome k and p k = ψ k |ψ k the corresponding probability. Let
By assumption, this inequality is saturated, which implies that ψ k |Q k |ψ k = 1 whenever p k > 0. So all kets |ϕ k ⊗|ψ k with p k > 0 belong to the pass eigenspace (corresponding to the eigenvalue 1) of each test operator E and thus the pass eigenspace of Ω. Note that the number of outcomes with p k > 0 is at least equal to the Schmidt rank of |Ψ . So the dimension of the pass eigenspace of Ω is not smaller than the Schmidt rank of |Ψ ; in particular, it is not smaller than 2 given that |Ψ is entangled. Therefore, |Ψ cannot be verified if Alice performs only one projective measurement; the same conclusion holds if Bob performs only one projective measurement. In general the proposition follows from the fact that a multipartite state is also a bipartite state between one party and the other parties.
